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WHILE  EUROPE 
WAITS  FOR  PEACE 


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THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA   •    SAIJ   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limitko 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •    CALCIJTTA 
MELBOURNB 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


WHILE  EUROPE 
WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

Describing  the  Progress  of  Economic 
and  Political  Demoralization  in  Europe 
During  the  Year  of  American  Hesitation 


BY 
PIERREPONT  B.  NOYES 

American  Rhineland  Commissioner 
April  1919  to  June  1920 


Jl3eto  gorfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1921 

All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIOHT,    1921, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published,  January,  1921 


TO 

MR.  BERNARD  M,  BARUCH 

whose  wonderful  work  as  Head  of  the  War 
Industry  Board  was  a  prime  factor  in 
America's  contribution  towards  winning  the 
war,  and  whose  courage,  optimism  and 
unselfish  fidelity  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  the  Allies,  both  during 
the  war  and  afterwards  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, was  a  source  of  inspiration  to  all 
his  associates. 


61'^'7'IS 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  thank  M.  Jean 
Parmentier  of  the  French  Government, 
Colonel  I.  L.  Hunt,  formerly  ''Officer  in 
Charge  of  Civil  Affairs"  in  the  American 
area  of  occupation,  and  Wallace  H.  Day, 
my  deputy  in  the  Rhineland,  for  valuable 
assistance  in  obtaining  facts  on  which  the 
statements  in  this  book  are  based. 


WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR 
PEACE 

CHAPTER  I 

FOREWORD 

The  American  people  have  always  been 
so  oblivious  to  happenings  in  other  coun- 
tries that  their  intense  concentration  dur- 
ing the  Great  War  on  the  daily  news  from 
Europe  was  very  abnormal.  The  indiffer- 
ence which  followed  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  was  a  natural  reaction.  Then 
came  the  long  struggle  over  the  Peace 
Treaty,  which  was  made  more  unpopular 
by  an  accumulation  of  domestic  problems 
pressing  for  settlement,  and  which  ulti- 
mately changed  public  indfference  to  such 
a  positive  distaste  for  foreign  news  that 
editors  and  publishers  were  forced  to  rec- 
ognize it.     The  result  has  been  that  for 


2  WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

more  than  a  year  the  wires  have  been  cut, 
as  it  were,  and  a  dangerous  ignorance 
of  European  developments  has  resulted. 
Few  Americans  seem  to  realize  how  near 
Europe  is  to  collapse — physical,  moral,  in- 
dustrial, financial. 

This  book  is  an  attempt  to  supply  the 
missing  information.  While  I  have  al- 
lowed myself  to  draw  certain  general  con- 
clusions, my  aim  has  been  to  give  facts  and 
portray  conditions  as  they  actually  exist  in 
Europe. 

From  the  early  days  of  the  armistice  un- 
til June  of  this  year  I  was  the  American 
representative  on  that  Commission  of  four 
which,  by  the  terms  of  the  ''Agreement" 
with  Germany,  became  the  ' '  Supreme  Rep- 
resentative of  the  Allies"  in  the  "occupied 
territories."  My  post  proved  to  be  the 
storm  center  of  Europe  and  my  official  con- 
nection with  the  most  important  actors  and 
events  during  this  period  gave  me  oppor- 
tunity to  check  up  from  original  sources 
the  facts  and  figures  which  I  shall  present. 

It  is  probable  that  the  average  Ameri- 
can citizen  has  at  no  time  concealed  from 


FOREWORD  3 

himself  the  dangers  which  would  follow  a 
vicious  war  settlement.  His  complacency 
has  been  founded  on  ignorance  of  facts. 
He  has  felt  that  European  countries  were 
gradually  working  out  their  own  problems, 
and  this  feeling  has  been  encouraged  by  the 
fact  that  nearly  two  years  have  passed 
since  the  war  and  no  catastrophe  has  oc- 
curred. Interested  foreigners,  and  Amer- 
ican ** observers"  who  observed  from  our 
shore  of  the  Atlantic  or  from  European  car 
windows,  have  done  their  share  to  lull  the 
people  of  the  United  States  into  a  feeling 
of  security. 

This  optimism  seems  to  me  so  dangerous 
that  I  feel  bound  to  do  what  little  one  man 
can  to  open  the  eyes  of  the  American  peo- 
ple to  the  tragedy  impending  in  Europe, 
and  to  the  danger  to  ourselves  as  well,  if 
we  do  not  take  a  responsible  part  in  the 
"settlement"  before  it  is  too  late. 


CHAPTER  II 

EUROPE  AFTER  THE  WAR 

Up  to  the  very  day  war  was  declared  ex- 
perts insisted,  and  the  people  believed,  that 
a  general  war  was  for  economic  reasons 
impossible,  or  at  least  that  it  must  be  very 
brief.  Volumes  were  written  to  prove  that 
the  cost  of  modern  war-making  would 
reduce  the  richest  country  to  bankruptcy 
within  a  few  weeks.  Yet,  for  more  than 
four  years  the  greatest  nations  of  the  world 
maintained  a  struggle  on  the  most  gigantic 
scale  and  with  an  unremitting  intensity  of 
action  beyond  any  war  in  history.  A  ma- 
jority of  the  male  population  of  Europe, 
and  later  of  America,  either  fought  in  the 
ranks  or  produced  supplies  for  the  armies, 
and  the  destruction  of  property  reached  a 
total  hitherto  undreamed  of.  Month  after 
month  we  saw  the  armies  grow  larger  and 
munitions  increase,  both  in  quantity  and 

4 


EUROPE  AFTER  THE  WAR  5 

destructive  efficiency.  All  economic  tra- 
ditions were  shattered.  War  came  to  seem 
the  normal  occupation  of  mankind.  As 
years  went  by  our  minds  became  accus- 
tomed to  the  idea  of  endless  fighting. 
Financial  miracles  were  commonplaces  and 
people  ceased  to  speculate  on  the  economic 
conditions  which  would  follow  the  war. 

When  a  series  of  events  has  proved  our 
earlier  opinions  false  or  exaggerated,  it  is 
easy  to  forget  that  we  ever  held  such  opin- 
ions, and  although  the  unexpected  results 
may  have  followed  an  error  as  to  one  fac- 
tor only,  all  that  was  true  in  our  original 
conception  is  apt  to  be  abandoned  along 
with  the  false.  This  is  especially  the  case 
when  the  disproof  is  positive  and  dramatic. 

From  a  pre-war  belief  that  world  in- 
solvency must  follow  even  a  short  general 
conflict,  the  average  mind  swung  to  the 
other  extreme  and  came  to  hold  the  settle- 
ment of  the  world's  war  losses  as  a  rather 
academic  problem  to  be  adjusted  between 
victor  and  vanquished.  Especially  in 
America,  where  there  was  no  devastation 
and  the  losses  were  smallest,  people  were 


6  WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

prepared  to  minimize  the  problem  of  Euro- 
pean restoration.  As  a  nation  we  were 
war-weary.  Our  own  minor  problems  of 
adjustment  seemed  large.  The  call  for 
help  came  faint  and  confused,  and,  being 
far  removed  from  the  turmoil  in  Europe, 
we  allowed  ourselves  to  believe  what  we 
wished  to  believe — that  European  reorgan- 
ization was  coming  along  fairly  well  and 
that  we  could  safely  and  conscientiously 
leave  the  people  of  the  war-wrecked  coun- 
tries to  work  out  their  owm  salvation. 

Unfortunately,  our  pre-war  theory  that 
even  a  short  war  meant  economic  ruin  was 
more  nearly  correct  than  our  later  compla- 
cency. The  only  error  in  this  theory  arose 
from  overlooking  the  reserve  resources, 
both  material  and  spiritual,  which  exist  in 
all  nations  and  which  can  be  temporarily 
brought  to  bear  when  the  issue  seems  life 
or  death. 

Like  a  man  in  the  delirium  of  fever  who 
performs  impossible  physical  feats,  appar- 
ently defying  all  natural  laws,  nations 
locked  in  a  death  struggle  are  able  to  mus- 
ter forces  unsuspected  and  at  other  times 


EUROPE  AFTER  THE  WAR  7 

unavailable.  Like  the  fever  patient  also, 
their  collapse  when  the  struggle  ends  is 
proportionately  severe.  Europe  since  the 
armistice  has  experienced  just  such  a  col- 
lapse— economically,  politically  and  so- 
cially. 

The  American  people  should  face  the 
disagreeable  fact  that  little  real  progress 
has  been  made  toward  European  restora- 
tion, and  that  ruin  still  stalks  in  plain  sight 
of  most  of  our  former  allies ;  and  the  ad- 
ditional fact  that  little  progress  can  be 
made  without  our  active  help. 

Before  entering  upon  details  I  ought  to 
add  that  the  repair  of  material  destruc- 
tion in  Europe  is  greatly  hindered  by  na- 
tional hatreds  and  antagonisms,  and  by 
the  poisoning  influence  of  fear  in  national 
councils. 

Two  days  before  the  French  Army  in- 
vaded Frankfort,  Darmstadt  and  other  ter- 
ritory across  the  Rhine  last  April,  I  was 
officially  informed  that  the  French  Gov- 
ernment had  decided  on  this  military 
move.  A  high  French  official  to  whom  I 
expressed  regret  and  who  was,  I  think,  in- 


8         WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

clined  to  regret  the  decision  himself,  told 
me  that  the  Government  was  "being 
pushed  from  behind" — that  the  people  in 
France  were  forcing  the  Administration 
to  adopt  an  aggressive  military  policy  to- 
ward Germany. 

During  June  I  was  discussing  the  situa- 
tion with  the  German  Foreign  Minister  in 
Berlin.  He  talked  to  me  very  frankly  and, 
in  the  course  of  our  conversation,  made 
one  significant  statement.  ' '  France, ' '  said 
he,  '*  refuses  to  permit  us  to  make  any  start 
toward  economic  recovery.  I  admit  that 
France  will  be  taking  some  chances  in  let- 
ting us  become  economically  strong,  but 
she  will  have  to  take  those  chances,  or  give 
up  any  idea  of  indemnity." 

These  two  statements  furnish  a  clew  to 
the  psychological  factor  which  is  mainly 
responsible  for  the  ''creeping  paralysis" 
now  afflicting  the  continental  nations. 


CHAPTER  in 

THE  CRUX  OF  THE  SITUATION— FRANCE  AND 
GERMANY 

It  is  very  necessary  after  such  a  destruc- 
tive war  that  suspended  production  be 
started  as  promptly  as  possible.  The  only 
remedy  for  an  economic  sickness  such 
as  exists  to-day  in  Europe — the  only  hope 
of  the  millions  and  the  only  chance  for 
peace  lies  in  production  and  more  produc- 
tion. But  war  not  only  destroys  the  prod- 
ucts of  industry — it  disarranges  the  en- 
tire industrial  machinery.  Hence,  each 
nation  must  reconstruct  its  productive  sys- 
tem as  quickly  as  possible  under  pain  of 
social  and  pohtical  degeneration  if  it  fails. 

A  survey  of  European  conditions  and 
especially  of  the  progress  made  toward 
industrial  revival  by  the  European  na- 
tions will  be  greatly  simplified  if  we  con- 
centrate our  examination  on  France  and 
Germany.    These  two  nations  have  been 


10        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

the  hub  of  the  continental  system.  They 
are  the  seat  of  the  present  disease. 
Within  their  boundaries  live  more  than 
100,000,000  of  the  best  producers  in  Eu- 
rope. These  two  are  so  situated  with  ref- 
erence to  other  countries  that  their  eco- 
nomic condition  is  the  determining  factor 
in  the  welfare  of  most  of  the  continental 
nations.  Together  with  England  (omit- 
ting Eussia  for  the  present),  they  repre- 
sent three-fourths  of  the  productive  capac- 
ity upon  which  the  470,000,000  inhabitants 
of  Europe  depend  for  prosperity  and  hap- 
piness. 

Great  Britain,  while  she  is  unquestion- 
ably the  most  favored  spot  on  the  Euro- 
pean economic  map,  and  the  only  impor- 
tant country  making  progress,  can  be 
neglected  in  this  survey.  One  has  only  to 
consider  her  debts,  her  loss  of  foreign 
trade,  her  labor  situation,  hor  Irish  crisis 
and  the  steady  drop  in  the  value  of  the 
pound  sterling  to  recognize  that  while  her 
indomitable  courage  and  willingness  to 
face  her  troubles  frankly  and  to  tax  herself 
savagely  are  likely  to  keep  her  afloat  until 


THE  CRUX  OF  THE  SITUATION  11 

she  can  make  the  shore,  she  positively  can- 
not take  any  one  else  into  the  boat  without 
sinking  it. 

Russia  I  have  omitted  because  we  have 
little  real  information  as  to  her  condition, 
and  for  the  time  being  that  country  is  cut 
off  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  Italy  is 
struggling  with  an  almost  hopeless  inter- 
nal situation.  A  country  without  coal  and 
formerly  very  dependent  upon  foreign  cap- 
ital, she  will  sink  or  swim  with  the  failure 
or  success  of  her  larger  industrial  neigh- 
bors. The  little  nations,  new  and  old, 
while  in  the  aggregate  they  represent  with 
Italy  perhaps  a  quarter  of  the  European 
production,  are  so  tied  economically  to  the 
fortunes  of  France  and  the  old  central  Ger- 
man bloc,  that  whatever  conditions  we  find 
in  France  and  Germany  will  very  largely 
govern  their  fate. 

Europe,  then,  must  stand  or  fall  with  the 
success  or  failure  of  reconstruction  and 
economic  revival  in  France  and  Germany, 
and  the  steady  deterioration  of  Europe's 
economic  condition  from  the  date  of  the 
armistice  down  to  the  present  time  has 


12        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

arisen  from  progressive  deterioration  in 
these  two  countries.  They  are  both  sorely 
wounded ;  they  are  poverty-stricken  beyond 
anything  known  in  modern  times.  They 
have  need  of  each  other;  they  need  coop- 
eration. All  their  energy  and  intelligence 
should  have  been  directed  during  these 
eighteen  months  to  nursing  such  industrial 
and  economic  resources  as  they  had  left. 
Even  had  they  cleared  away  the  rubbish  of 
war  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  adopted  a 
policy  of  cooperation,  the  task  ahead  of 
them  would  still  have  been  a  terribly  dif- 
ficult one.  But  hatred,  distrust  and  fear 
have  dictated  an  opposite  course. 


CHAPTER  IV 

CONDITIONS  IN  FRANCE 

In  order  to  get  a  clear  view  of  the  eco- 
nomic problems  before  the  French  people, 
it  will  be  well  to  show,  first,  the  situation 
which  confronted  them  on  the  day  the  ar- 
mistice was  signed,  lest  stories  of  the 
truly  heroic  efforts  toward  restoration 
already  made  in  the  devastated  regions  di- 
vert attention  from  the  overwhelming  mag- 
nitude of  France's  original  problem.  The 
wonderful  courage  as  well  as  pride  of  the 
French  people  would  conceal  from  the 
world  how  inadequate  all  of  these  efforts 
have  been  for  the  solution  of  that  prob- 
lem. France  would  rather  be  represented 
to  the  world  as  hopeful  and  determined 
than  as  an  object  for  pity,  and  yet,  with  aU 
their  courage  and  hopefulness,  the  respon- 
sible men  of  France  are  sick  at  heart  when 
they  contemplate  the  gigantic  task  ahead 

13 


14        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

of  the  nation  and  the  broken  tools  with 
which  they  must  work. 

The  war  cost  France  in  cash  nearly  $40,- 
000,000,000.  Her  interior  debt  has  in- 
creased since  1913  $28,000,000,000  and  her 
foreign  debt,  of  which  there  was  none  in 
1913,  is  now  nearly  $6,000,000,000. 

The  destruction  of  property  in  France 
during  the  war  has  been  variously  esti- 
mated at  from  $15,000,000,000  to  $30,000,- 
000,000.  The  capitalization  of  pensions 
for  orphans  and  wounded  is  $10,000,000,- 
000.  Although  the  total  of  these  liabilities 
would  be  considerably  reduced  if  figured  in 
par  exchange,  such  an  estimate  would  be 
misleading.  To  obtain  an  American  equiv- 
alent for  the  internal  debt,  the  value  of  the 
franc  to-day  in  French  labor  and  materials 
must  be  used  and,  of  course,  the  full  amount 
of  the  foreign  debt,  $6,000,000,000,  must  be 
added.  If,  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  we 
cut  in  half  the  interior  debt  and  the  cost 
of  reconstruction,  and  the  pensions,  we  still 
have  a  staggering  total  of  somewhere  be- 
tween 35  and  40  billion  dollars  lost  by 
France  through  the  war.    It  should  be  re- 


CONDITIONS  IN  FRANCE  15 

membered  that  France  is  a  country  of  only 
40,000,000  people  and  that  a  few  years  ago 
Sir  George  Paish  estimated  the  total  value 
of  all  property  in  France,  public  and  pri- 
vate, as  $50,000,000,000. 

These  huge  liabilities  created  by  the  war 
are  not  the  whole  story.  The  French  peo- 
ple bore  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  and  their 
country  was  the  battleground.  As  a  result 
their  most  serious  loss  is  the  destruction 
of  equipment  and  the  demoralization  of 
those  economic  forces  on  which  they  must 
rely  to  make  good  the  huge  deficit.  One 
and  one-half  million  of  the  men  of  France 
between  eighteen  and  forty — her  best  pro- 
ducers— have  been  killed,  and  in  spite  of 
this  she  feels  she  must  keep  up  a  standing 
army  of  700,000  men  until  some  world  set- 
tlement is  made  which  will  relieve  her  of 
the  old  danger  of  invasion. 

The  devastated  region,  while  only  7  per 
cent,  of  the  area  of  France,  furnished  be- 
fore the  war  one-fifth  of  her  exports. 
From  it  came  92  per  cent,  of  the  iron  ore ; 
more  than  half  of  the  coal  (in  fact,  a  large 
proportion  of  the  industrial  coal) ;  60  per 


16        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

cent,  of  the  steel ;  77  per  cent,  of  the  zinc ; 
22  per  cent,  of  the  lead ;  20  per  cent,  of  the 
machinery  and  machine  tools ;  80  per  cent. 
of  the  linen ;  70  per  cent,  of  the  cotton  tex- 
tiles, besides  very  large  contributions  to 
the  clothing  of  the  comitry. 

Of  course  not  all  of  the  machinery  for 
this  production  was  destroyed,  but  the  coal 
mines  and  the  basic  iron  and  steel  mills 
were  wiped  out  to  such  an  extent  that  in 
March  of  this  year  the  mines  had  recov- 
ered only  about  13  per  cent.,  and  the  steel 
and  metal  mills  only  23  per  cent. 

It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  region 
where  destruction  was  the  worst  contained 
steel  construction  plants  and  most  of  the 
factories  making  tools  and  hardware,  so 
greatly  needed  by  all  other  industries. 
This  is  also  the  district  which,  more  than 
any  other,  manufactured  what  have  been 
called  the  ''essential"  items  of  merchan- 
dise, while  the  regions  not  touched  by  war 
were  devoted  more  to  wines,  silks  and  other 
luxuries.  The  importance  of  this  fact  will 
be  appreciated  at  this  time  when  the  recon- 
struction of  France  and  Europe  places  es- 


CONDITIONS  IN  FRANCE  17 

pecial  emphasis  on  the  production  of  es- 
sentials. Stress  might  be  laid  on  the  crip- 
pling of  the  railways — on  the  devastation 
of  food-producing  land  and  the  loss  of  an 
enormous  number  of  cattle.  I  wish,  how- 
ever, to  bring  into  this  survery  only  those 
larger  factors  which,  in  my  opinion,  have 
rendered  France  unable  to  save  herself 
economically  without  help  from  the  out- 
side. 

When  this  situation  was  considered  by 
the  representatives  of  all  the  allies  assem- 
bled in  Paris,  it  was  unanimously  agreed 
that  France's  salvation  depended  upon  a 
huge  German  indemnity ;  German  coal  as  a 
basic  industrial  necessity,  and  German 
money  for  financial  solvency. 

Before  leaving  the  survey  of  French  con- 
ditions, it  should  be  recognized  that  the 
miseries  of  war  and  the  hopeless  character 
of  the  peace  up  to  date  have  created  a  very 
dangerous  internal  situation. 

It  is  immensely  to  the  credit  of  the 
French  people  that  during  this  very  trying 
year,  radicahsm  has  not  gone  further  in 
adding  to  chaos.    But  there  is  a  limit  to 


IS        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

this  immunity.  Proportionately,  the  radi- 
cal element  in  France  has  been  increased; 
for  it  was  found  necessary  during  the  war 
to  send  a  very  large  number  of  the  factory 
workers  back  from  the  front  in  order  to 
keep  up  the  manufacture  of  necessary  sup- 
plies. Women  could  perform  much  of  the 
farm  work,  but  the  factories  depended 
upon  the  presence  of  skilled  workmen. 
The  result  was  that  out  of  the  1,500,000 
killed,  France  lost  a  much  larger  propor- 
tion of  her  conservative  peasant  popula- 
tion than  of  her  industrialists.  This  shift- 
ing of  balance  may  have  a  very  decided  ef- 
fect on  future  events.  The  increase  of 
conservative  deputies  returned  to  Parlia- 
ment at  last  year's  general  election  was 
hailed  as  evidence  that  the  masses  in 
France  were  becoming  less  radical.  An 
examination,  however,  of  election  statistics 
shows  that  more  socialists  and  ultra- radi- 
cal votes  were  cast  than  in  any  previous 
election. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  a  confirmation  of 
the  desperate  economic  outlook  I  have  de- 
picted, which  can  be  read  "between  the 


CONDITIONS  IN  FRANCE  19 

lines"  as  it  were,  in  a  statement  made  re- 
cently to  the  National  City  Bank  by  the 
head  of  a  great  French  bank.  This  state- 
ment is  mainly  devoted  to  showing  what  re- 
markable progress  France  has  made  under 
the  circumstances.  I  quote  the  significant 
paragraph : 

**0n  the  day  of  the  armistice,  the  whole  Amer- 
ican army  in  France  did  not  possess  a  single 
field-gun  which  had  not  been  constructed  in  and 
supplied  by  France.  Imagine  the  United  States 
in  the  same  situation ;  having  lost  the  coal-fields 
in  the  Alleghanies,  the  iron  ore  of  the  lakes,  some 
of  the  largest  and  richest  cities  such  as  Chicago, 
Cleveland,  and  Pittsburg ;  having  had  three  mil- 
lion five  hundred  thousand  men  killed,  and  while 
struggling  for  their  life  on  their  own  soil,  help- 
ing others  to  get  ready  and  devoting  all  their 
productive  capacity  to  war-material,  while  others 
had  something  over  for  domestic  requirements 
and  investments  such  as  shipbuilding,  etc.,  how 
would  American  economic  conditions  look,  under 
these  circumstances,  after  five  years  ? ' ' 

He  might  have  added  to  this  picture  an 
American  standing  army  of  2,000,000  men, 
which  in  proportion  to  our  population  rep- 


20        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

resents  the  burden  entailed  upon  France 
by  the  700,000  soldiers  she  maintains  at  the 
present  time. 


CHAPTER  V 

CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY 

The  total  German  war  expenses,  includ- 
ing loans  to  insolvent  allies,  were  consider- 
ably larger  than  those  of  France.  Ger- 
many's national  debt  is  now  around  190,- 
000,000,000  marks,  to  which  must  be  added 
an  unsecured  note  circulation  of  about  half 
that  amount,  and  liabilities  for  indemnity 
to  her  own  subjects  of  over  100,000,000,000 
marks.  On  their  face  these  debts  are 
equivalent  in  American  money  to  more 
than  $100,000,000,000.  The  total  is  re- 
duced, however,  to  about  $30,000,000,000  if 
as  in  the  French  estimate  we  use  the  pres- 
ent value  of  the  **mark"  in  German  labor. 
On  the  other  side,  it  should  be  noted  that 
any  attempt  to  redeem  the  circulating 
notes  and  so  restore  German  currency 
would  bring  these  notes  very  close  to  par 
and  thus  largely  increase  the  debt  figure 

21 


22        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

stated  above.  To  the  debt  must  be  added 
the  minimum  indemnity  imposed  on  Ger- 
many by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  which  is 
there  stated  as  approximately  $24,000,- 
000,000. 

While  in  one  way  it  is  now  an  advantage 
to  Germany  that  she  was  obliged  during 
the  war  to  do  all  her  borrowing  at  home, 
this  is  offset  by  the  fact  that  having  had  to 
rely  almost  entirely  on  her  own  material 
resources  she  found  herself  in  1919  abso- 
lutely bare  of  merchandise  and  of  the  raw 
materials  with  which  to  manufacture  more. 
An  American  buyer  of  long  experience  in 
Germany  passed  through  Coblenz  during 
the  fall  of  1919  with  a  $25,000,000  credit  to 
be  used  in  buying  German  merchandise  for 
export.  He  returned  six  weeks  later  and 
told  me  that  he  had  advised  his  syndicate 
to  withdraw  the  credit ;  he  found  no  stocks 
of  any  kind  in  Germany.  He  said  there 
were  small  quantities  of  merchandise  in  re- 
tail stores,  but  absolutely  no  wholesale 
stocks. 

The  labor  situation  is  another  serious 
factor  in  the  problem  of  German  economic 


CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY  23 

revival.  German  industrial  supremacy 
was  founded  on  a  productive  capacity  per 
man  which  no  longer  exists.  In  most 
trades  the  output  per  man  is  now  a  little 
over  one-half  what  it  was  before  the  war, 
due  partly  to  shorter  hours  which  came 
with  the  revolution  of  November,  1918, 
partly  to  six  years  of  under-feeding,  and 
partly  to  a  radicalism  which  makes  the 
masses  disinclined  to  work  effectively. 

When  I  talked  with  the  Minister  of  Eco- 
nomics last  June  as  to  the  relative  impor- 
tance of  the  various  factors  operating  to 
prevent  industrial  revival,  he  rated  the 
shortage  of  coal  as  one  of  the  worst.  In 
fact,  he  placed  it  second  only  to  the  unlim- 
ited indemnity. 

During  the  year  1919  production  of  in- 
dustrial coal  in  Germany  was  about  60  per 
cent,  of  the  1914  total.  As  President  of 
the  Interallied  Committee  on  Coal  for  the 
occupied  territory,  I  made  a  careful  inves- 
tigation as  to  the  cause  of  this  reduction  in 
output.  The  ineffectiveness  of  labor,  re- 
ferred to  above,  was  blamed  for  about  two- 
thirds   of   the   difference.    I   found   that 


24        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

whereas  one  ton  of  coal  per  man  was  mined 
in  Germany  before  and  during  the  war,  the 
average  in  1919  was  .58  ton.  The  balance 
of  the  shrinkage  was  accounted  for  by  de- 
terioration of  equipment  and  by  loss  of  the 
Saar  and  Lorraine  coal  fields  to  France. 

Looking  to  the  future,  the  Germans  are 
worrying  over  the  threatened  loss  of  the 
LTpper  Silesian  coal  field  which  produced 
annually  about  45,000,000  tons  before  the 
war.  If  the  plebiscite  gives  this  district  to 
Poland,  Germany  will  be  obliged  to  reduce 
shipments  of  coal  to  France  or  allow  her 
own  industries  to  collapse. 

During  1919  the  average  amount  of  coal 
received  by  German  industries  was  little 
better  than  30  per  cent,  of  their  normal 
consumption.  The  steel  mills,  because 
they  were  near  the  mines  and  the  output  of 
coal  at  pit-mouths  was  greater  than  the 
available  cars  to  transport  it,  received  as 
high  as  60  per  cent,  of  their  requirements. 
This  summer,  however,  delivery  of  coal  to 
steel  mills  has  fallen  to  about  40  per  cent, 
of  their  requirements. 

The  contest  between  France  and  Ger- 


CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY  23 

many  over  coal  deliveries  has  been  misun- 
derstood in  this  country.  The  Versailles 
Treaty  called  upon  Germany  to  deliver  to 
the  allies  314  million  tons  per  month. 
This  was  so  manifestly  impossible  that  on 
August  28, 1919,  a  new  protocol  was  signed 
reducing  the  demand  to  about  214  million 
tons  per  month  with  a  sliding  scale  based 
on  increased  production.  When,  during 
the  futile  discussion  in  Paris  last  March 
between  the  Reparation  Commission  and 
the  German  Coal  Delegation,  I  was  called 
in  as  the  American  expert,  I  urged  that 
France  for  her  own  sake  recognize  the 
facts  and  make  a  business-like  bargain 
with  the  German  Coal  Kommissar,  one 
which  could  be  and,  I  believed,  would  be 
kept.  I  informed  our  representative  on 
the  Reparation  Commission  that  Germany 
could  at  that  time  deliver  ly^  million  tons, 
but  no  more.  M.  Poincaire  was  unwilling 
to  discuss  with  Germany  any  reduction, 
and  as  a  result  deliveries  continued  at 
about  600,000  tons  per  month,  until  at  the 
Spa  Conference  in  June,  2,000,000  tons  was 
agreed  upon.     This  quantity,  considering 


26        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

the  increase  of  German  production  at  that 
time,  corresponds  very  closely  with  my 
1,250,000  tons  in  March. 

Lack  of  transportation  is  another  ob- 
stacle to  economic  revival.  Of  ocean  ship- 
ping Germany  has  practically  none  left. 
Her  river  and  canal  equipment  have  been 
much  reduced  by  the  operation  of  the 
Treaty.  Wliile  the  railroads,  especially 
the  Prussian  lines,  are  doing  much  better 
than  one  would  expect  from  the  statistical 
situation,  the  5,000  locomotives  sent  to 
France  and  Beligum,  the  bad  condition  of 
those  left  in  Germany,  the  lack  of  good  re- 
pair material,  and  the  inefficiency  of  shop 
workers  have  created  a  shortage  of  loco- 
motive power  felt  with  especial  severity  in 
coal  distribution.  Out  of  22,000  locomo- 
tives left  in  Germany,  10,000  are  continu- 
ally in  the  repair  shops. 

Food  is  still  one  of  the  worst  deficiencies. 
Herbert  Hoover  (the  best  informed  man 
in  America  on  European  food  conditions) 
told  me  that  normally  Germany  can  pro- 
duce only  four-sevenths  of  her  own  food — 
the  balance  must  be  imported  in  exchange 


CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY  27 

for  German  exports.  Such  imports  of 
food  are  only  possible  now  at  ruinous 
prices  on  account  of  the  rate  of  exchange. 
The  Government  has  already  spent  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  marks  in  subsidizing 
food  to  bring  prices  within  the  limits  of  the 
workingman's  purse.  The  mass  of  the 
people  in  Germany  can  only  afford  to  buy 
this  subsidized  food,  and  the  subsidized 
''ration"  during  the  first  seven  months  of 
1920  contained  only  1,090  calories  as 
against  1,500  calories  during  the  war,  and 
3,000  calories  before  the  war.  Both  pro- 
duction and  the  morale  of  the  people  in 
Germany  are  suffering  from  this  continued 
under-feeding. 

The  Versailles  Treaty  calls  on  Germany 
to  pay  a  minimum  indemnity  of  100,000,- 
000,000  gold  marks — approximately  24,- 
000,000,000  gold  dollars  which,  paid  in 
francs  at  present  exchange  rate,  would 
equal  400,000,000,000  francs.  In  1871  Ger- 
many imposed  upon  France  an  indemnity 
of  5,000,000,000  francs.  At  the  time  this 
was  expected  to  ruin  France,  and  history 
has    applauded    the    heroic    energy    with 


28        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

which  she  accomplished  the  seemingly  im- 
possible by  paying  the  whole  amount 
within  two  years.  After  riiaking  every  al- 
lowance, it  is  not  reasonable  to  expect  that 
France  can  collect  from  Germany  80  times 
the  indemnity  imposed  in  1871.  The  at- 
tempt does  not  seem  a  good  business  prop- 
osition unless  the  advantage  sought  is  Ger- 
man bankruptcy  instead  of  cash.  Cer- 
tainly, in  the  light  of  the  economic  pros- 
tration described  above,  the  policy  of  Great 
Britain  and  Italy,  which  calls  for  a  revision 
of  the  Treaty,  seems  the  wisest  course, 
both  in  the  interest  of  France  and  the  peace 
of  the  world. 

The  most  depressing  influence  of  all  on 
German  economic  life  is  the  uncertainty 
created  by  allied  refusal  to  fix  a  limit  for 
the  indemnity.  This  has  been  one  of  the 
chief  points  of  difference  between  Great 
Britain  and  France,  and  the  facts  should  be 
clearly  understood. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  recognizes  that 
Germany  ought  to  pay  for  all  the  devasta- 
tion, as  well  as  the  cost  to  the  allies,  of  the 
war.     Nothing  which   has   come  to   light 


CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY  29 

since  the  armistice  has  raised  a  doubt  as  to 
the  justice  of  this  proposition — theoretic- 
ally. Practically,  the  Peace  Commission- 
ers agreed  that  such  complete  reimburse- 
ment was  impossible.  Being  ignorant  of 
German  economic  conditions,  they  left  the 
total  amount  of  the  indemnity  to  be  settled 
when  more  information  regarding  Ger- 
many's finances  should  be  obtained.  The 
Treaty  names  100,000,000,000  gold  marks 
as  an  immediate  payment  to  be  recognized 
by  the  issuance  of  German  gold  bonds. 
Beyond  that,  the  Reparation  Commission 
is  to  decide  as  to  how  much  additional  in- 
demnity the  Germans  can  pay  year  by  year 
without  ruining  their  industries.  For  two 
years  this  uncertainty  has  hung  over  the 
economic  life  of  Germany  like  the  sword  of 
Damocles. 

If  you  say  to  a  person,  ''Work  as  hard 
as  you  can  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  we 
will  decide  how  much  of  your  product  we 
will  take  from  you,"  there  is  no  incentive 
for  that  person  to  work.  Equally,  if  you 
say  to  capital,  domestic  or  foreign — "We 
are  waiting  to  see  how  much  real  money 


30        ^HILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

will  come  into  sight  in  Germany  before  set- 
tling on  a  maximum  indemnity,"  capital 
will  certainly  refuse  to  show  itself.  That 
provision  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  which 
permits  the  allies  to  add  to  the  minimum 
indemnity  of  $24,000,000,000  whatever  they 
decide  at  a  later  date  Germany  is  capable 
of  paying  has  so  far  deprived  her  people  of 
incentive  to  enterprise,  and  her  industries 
of  much  needed  new  capital.  More  than  a 
year  ago  the  representative  of  a  group  of 
American  capitalists  who  were  prepared 
under  certain  conditions  to  grant  large 
financial  credits  to  German  industries,  told 
me  that  they  considered  it  unwise  to  invest 
a  cent  in  Germany  until  the  limits  of  the  in- 
demnity had  been  fixed. 

It  has  been  and  is  to-day  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  Germany  and  to  Europe,  and 
it  is  an  essential  prerequisite  to  the  pay- 
ment of  any  indemnity,  that  the  broken  cir- 
cle of  production — raw  material,  power, 
(coal),  labor,  transportation  and  sale — be 
repaired  as  quickly  as  possible.  So  far, 
there  has  been  no  progress  made  in  this 
direction. 


CONDITIONS  IN  GERMANY  31 

Certain  it  is  that  unemployment  in  Ger- 
many is  now  increasing  faster  than  at  any 
time  since  the  war.  Official  reports  in 
June,  1920,  showed  that  the  Government 
was  giving  unemplojTiient  pay  to  less  than 
1,000,000  men.  To-day  the  same  reports 
show  that  nearly  1,500,000  are  officially 
out  of  work  and  receiving  Government 
aid. 

To  sum  up,  Germany  finds  herself  de- 
prived of  her  iron  mines,  and  a  part  of  her 
coal,  with  a  debt  of  at  least  $30,000,000,000, 
a  fixed  liability  for  indemnity  of  another 
$24,000,000,000,  and  unable  after  nearly 
two  years  to  raise  the  production  of  her 
industries  to  a  point  where  she  can  pay  for 
the  foreign  food  absolutely  necessary  for 
the  feeding  of  her  people.  She  is  short  of 
coal,  short  of  food,  short  of  transportation, 
crippled  by  social  unrest  and  a  weak  gov- 
ernment, and  her  future  is  shadowed  by 
such  uncertainty  regarding  the  financial 
and  political  intentions  of  the  allies  that 
the  population,  from  the  government  offi- 
cials down  to  the  workers  in  the  mines,  have 
become  possessed  with  a  sort  of  fatalistic 


32        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

hopelessness  which  has  killed  both  initia- 
tive and  energy. 

It  is  my  firm  opinion  that  Germany, 
once  the  industrial  backbone  of  continental 
Europe,  is  steadily  sinking  into  a  social 
and  economic  feebleness  very  dangerous  to 
the  peace  of  the  world.  I  agree  with  Mr. 
Paul  Cravath  that  it  will  be  hard  to  make 
Bolshevists  of  the  German  people— that 
this  is  not  a  real  danger  unless  the  allies 
leave  them  helpless  and  hopeless  too  long. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  DEADLOCK 

The  above  description  of  the  economic 
wreckage  left  by  the  war  in  France  and 
Germany  has  not  been  overdrawn.  I  be- 
lieve that  the  authorities  in  either  country, 
if  they  felt  free  to  speak  frankly,  would 
confirm  my  estimate.  To  complete  the  pic- 
ture, it  is  necessary  to  describe  the  dead- 
lock which  has  existed  between  these  two 
countries  up  to  the  present  time,  and  which 
by  defeating  their  attempts  to  revive  in- 
dustry and  restore  finance,  threatens  disas- 
ter to  both. 

French  statesmen  are  possessed  by  two 
great  fears.  The  first  is  a  very  natural 
dread  of  a  revengeful,  military  Germany 
again  grown  strong.  When  America  with- 
drew from  the  League,  this  fear  which  had 
been  fading  away  in  the  hopeful  prospect 
of  a  new  international  force  capable  of 
making  justice  an  effective  arbiter  between 

33 


34        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

nations,  swept  over  the  country  with  re- 
newed violence.  The  French  populace  pas- 
sionately threw  its  support  to  that  political 
group  which  has  no  confidence  in  any  inter- 
national agency  save  military  power. 
These  Chauvinists  (not  a  large,  though  an 
influential  group)  have  believed  through- 
out that  France  should  seize  the  present 
opportunity  so  to  destroy  or  mutilate  Ger- 
many as  to  render  her  old  enemy  perma- 
nently inferior  to  herself,  both  economic- 
ally and  in  a  military  way.  Now,  this  mili- 
tary party  in  France  finds  itself  backed  by 
an  almost  unanimous  people. 

Since  America  deserted,  French  policy 
has  been  poisoned  by  dreams :  1st,  of  sep- 
aratist movements  to  be  fomented  among 
the  German  states ;  2d,  of  estabHshing  her 
eastern  frontier  on  the  Ehine ;  3d,  of  a  mil- 
itaristic Poland  on  Germany's  eastern 
frontier ;  and  4th,  of  new  invasions  of  Ger- 
many. Many  German  activities  have  ap- 
peared to  threaten  these  ambitions  and 
have  been  promptly  crushed. 

For  instance,  when  the  Sparticists  cre- 
ated a  reign  of  terror  in  the  Ruhr  last 


THE  DEADLOCK  35 

March,  France  refused  the  German  Gov- 
ernment permission  to  send  enough  troops 
to  crush  the  rebellion,  and  when,  in  spite  of 
this  refusel,  18,000  more  reichswehr  than 
are  permitted  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
entered  the  Ruhr  and  cleaned  things  up, 
France  invaded  Frankfort  and  Darmstadt 
as  reprisal.  Since  the  most  radical  So- 
vietism  was  establishing  itself  throughout 
that  territory,  the  allies  would  have  been 
forced  to  occupy  the  Ruhr  themselves  had 
the  German  Government  withheld  its 
troops,  and  such  an  ** occupation"  would 
have  involved  France  and  the  allies  in  a 
major  military  adventure.  For  the  Ruhr 
is  a  tough  district,  a  mining  and  steel  mill 
district  containing  515,000  miners  and  a 
larger  number  of  mill  workers  (Russians, 
Poles  and  Itahans  being  mixed  with  the 
Germans).  The  Ruhr  is  also  more  in- 
fected with  Bolshevism  than  any  other 
part  of  Germany  with  the  possible  excep- 
tion of  Saxony. 

News  dispatches  sent  to  America  during 
the  ' '  Ruhr  Trouble ' '  were  very  conflicting. 
Later,  I  obtained  permission  to  go  through 


36        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

the  government  files  in  Berlin  and  found 
there  hundreds  of  original  letters  and  tele- 
grams confirming  the  reports  made  by  rep- 
resentatives of  the  American  Commanding 
General  who  were  in  the  Ruhr  during  the 
rebellion. 

Fear  dictated  French  insistence  on  re- 
duction of  the  German  army  to  100,000 
men.  It  is  not  simply  that  so  small  an 
army  will  place  Germany  at  the  mercy  of 
dangerous  eastern  neighbors,  but  100,000 
soldiers  cannot  keep  order  at  home  under 
present  unsettled  conditions.  She,  unlike 
America  and  Great  Britain,  has  always  de- 
pended upon  the  military  for  police  work. 
Local  police  forces  are  small.  In  Cologne, 
for  instance,  there  are  in  proportion  to  the 
population  less  than  one-quarter  as  many 
policemen  as  in  New  York  City.  The  local 
police  in  Germany  merely  manage  traffic 
and  arrest  drunks.  Serious  disorder  is 
handled  by  tlie  military. 

France  also  fears  the  economic  recuper- 
ative power  of  Germany.  French  states- 
men are  apprehensive  as  to  the  temper  of 
their  own  people  who  were  long  fed  on  glit- 


THE  DEADLOCK  37 

tering  promises  that  the  expected  flow  of 
German  money  into  France  would  permit 
a  low  tax  rate  to  be  maintained  and  would 
bring  prosperity.  Believing  that  if  given 
a  chance  industrial  revival  would  pro- 
ceed in  Germany  faster  than  in  France, 
these  statesmen  fear  that  the  French 
masses  would  vent  their  disappointment 
and  wrath  upon  the  Government.  Hence, 
the  French  refusal  to  fix  a  maximum  figure 
for  the  indemnity;  hence,  the  former 
French  insistence  on  more  coal  than  Ger- 
many could  possibly  send ;  hence,  also,  the 
French  opposition  to  outside  loans  to  Ger- 
many. In  fact,  the  determined  hostility  in 
France  to  any  revision  of  the  Treaty  for 
the  sake  of  adapting  it  to  known  conditions 
and  thus,  while  obtaining  all  practicable 
''reparations,"  make  economic  revival  in 
Germany  possible,  has  been  based  on  a  pro- 
found uneasiness  as  to  the  consequences  of 
such  revival. 


CHAPTER  VII 

MILITARY  OCCUPATION  OF  THE  RHINELAND 

The  allied  ''occupation"  of  the  western 
provinces  of  Germany,  originally  planned 
to  last  15  years  but  extended  for  an  indefi- 
nite period  by  M.  Millerand's  note  to  the 
Germans  last  March,  is  so  unmistakably  a 
prime  factor  in  the  European  outlook,  and 
it  so  directly  threatens  the  future  peace 
of  the  world,  that  knowledge  of  its  charac- 
ter and  history  is  essential  to  a  true  under- 
standing of  the  European  situation.  The 
history  of  Article  428  of  the  Peace  Treaty, 
and  of  the  "Ehineland  Agreement"  (cre- 
ated in  conformity  with  Article  432)  which 
defines  the  terms  of  "occupation"  are  typ- 
ical of  the  entire  struggle  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference between  what  is  now  referred  to  as 
the  ''Peace  Delusion"  of  Wilson  and  Lloyd 
George  and  the  "Continental  Policy" 
which  M.  Millerand  has  during  the  last  six 

38 


MILITARY  OCCUPATION  39 

months  triumphantly  reestabUshed.  Sim- 
ilarly the  character  and  history  of  the  ' '  oc- 
cupation,"  itself ,  suggest  the  foundation  of 
sand  upon  which  the  present  peace  of  Eu- 
rope is  built. 

All  that  portion  of  Germany  lying  west 
of  the  Rhine,  together  with  about  2,000 
square  miles  on  the  eastern  bank,  is  now 
"occupied"  by  allied  troops  under  condi- 
tions laid  down  in  the  "Agreement." 
Temporary  occupation  was  absolutely 
necessary.  This  "occupation,"  however, 
having  already  lasted  longer  than  the  Ger- 
man "occupation"  of  France  in  1871-72, 
must  according  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  con- 
tinue, with  possible  reduction  of  territory, 
for  15  years,  and  M.  Millerand  notified  the 
Germans  last  April  that  the  date  from 
which  the  15  years  should  be  reckoned  was 
postponed  until  all  obUgations  of  the 
Treaty  are  met  by  Germany.  Since  some 
of  these  conditions  cannot  be  complied  with 
at  the  present  time,  this  automatically  ex- 
tends the  "occupation"  indefinitely. 

In  order  to  realize  what  this  means  for 
the  peace  of  the  world,  Americans  should 


40        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

conceive  of  a  territory  about  tlie  size  of 
New  England,  with  a  larger  population 
than  is  contained  in  those  six  states,  and 
an  industrial  importance  for  Germany 
even  greater  than  New  England  has  for  the 
United  States,  occupied  by  120,000  enemy 
troops  and  its  people  and  government  sub- 
jected to  minute  inspection  and  interfer- 
ence by  representatives  of  its  traditional 
enemies. 

All  of  the  cities  in  the  Rhineland  are 
crowded  with  allied  officers  living  in  the 
finest  private  houses,  commandeered  from 
their  owners.  These  owners  are  usually 
permitted  to  live  in  a  few  rooms  in  the  rear 
or  in  the  attics  of  their  former  homes. 
Municipal  regulations,  including  street 
traffic  and  the  prices  of  merchandise,  and 
many  of  the  smaller  restrictions  which 
were  in  force  in  America  during  the  war, 
are  prescribed  by  the  representatives  of 
the  occupying  powers.  Every  German 
law  and  regulation  must  be  submitted  to 
those  representatives.  If  disapproved  by 
them  they  become  invalid  throughout  oc- 
cupied   Germany.    Newspapers   are   cen- 


MILITARY  OCCUPATION  41 

sored,  private  mail  may  at  any  time  be 
seized,  and  the  local  movements  of  persons 
may  be  subjected  to  passport  regulations. 
The  right  of  requisition  of  supplies  for  the 
allied  army  and  officials  may  at  any  time 
break  down  the  very  difficult  "rationing" 
plans  of  the  German  Food  Kommissar. 
The  appointment  of  even  local  officials  must 
be  approved,  and  their  liability  to  sum- 
mary removal  on  grounds  satisfactory  to 
the  Allied  Commission  alone  is  a  standing 
threat  to  landrats,  burgomeisters  and  pres- 
idents. Many  other  harassing  interfer- 
ences with  the  daily  life  of  the  population 
are  the  necessary  accompaniments  of  a 
hostile  ''occupation."  These  it  must  be 
remembered  are  conditions  in  the  ''occu- 
pied territory"  of  Germany  under  a 
regime  wliich  was  given  a  civilian  charac- 
ter and  made  as  liberal  as  possible  by  the 
moderate  elements  at  the  Peace  Conference 
against  violent  opposition  from  the  Mili- 
tary group. 

M.  Tardieu,  in  recent  magazine  articles, 
gives  an  account  of  the  struggle  over  this 
question  of  extended  "occupation."    He 


42        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

shows  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Presi- 
dent Wilson  were  for  months  unalterably 
opposed  to  it.  He  states  that  a  special  de- 
fensive alliance  was  offered  by  the  two 
Premiers  as  inducement  to  France  to  aban- 
don the  plan.  He  reveals  step  by  step  how 
M.  Clemenceau's  persistence  broke  down 
opposition  and  how  in  May,  1919,  by  con- 
ceding civilian  control,  he  finally  made  a 
15-year  ''occupation"  part  of  the  Treaty 
with  Germany. 

An  original  draft  for  the  ''Rhineland 
Agreement ' '  was  prepared  by  the  Supreme 
Military  Council  under  the  influence  of 
Marechal  Foch,  and  it  was  an  extremely 
brutal  document.  It  decreed  that  ''mar- 
tial law  with  all  its  consequences"  should 
remain  in  force  in  the  Rhineland  for  15 
years ;  it  placed  control  of  the  German  po- 
lice and  the  conduct  of  the  "occupation" 
in  the  hands  of  the  French  Military  Com- 
mander. 

I  was  at  that  time  serving  on  the  tem- 
porary Rhineland  Commission,  and  to- 
gether with  Sir  Harold  Stuart,  the  British 
Commissioner,   entered   a   strong   protest 


MILITARY  OCCUPATION  43 

against  this  plan  of  the  Supreme  Mili- 
tary Council.  Several  revisions  were  at- 
tempted, in  the  preparation  of  which  I  as- 
sisted, but,  becoming  convinced  that  a  mere 
revision  could  not  make  such  a  plan  work- 
able, I  wrote  a  letter  on  Ma}^  27th  to  Pres- 
ident Wilson  embodjdng  my  objections  and 
outlining  a  plan  for  civilian  control. 

This  letter  seems  to  have  reached  the 
President  at  a  psychological  moment,  for 
he  took  it  to  the  Supreme  Council  and  ob- 
tained unanimous  consent  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  committee  mstructed  to  draft  a 
plan  along  the  lines  I  had  suggested.  This 
committee,  after  a  week  of  continuous  ses- 
sion, presented  to  the  Peace  Conference  the 
"Ehineland  Agreement"  which  was  finally 
sigTied  by  Gemiany  and  the  allies  at  the 
same  time  as  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
The  French  ^' White  Book,"  containing  the 
discussions  of  this  special  committee, 
states  in  Paragraph  I : 

"That  a  Commission  composed  of: 

"A  representative  of  the  United  States  of 
America  who  will  be  designated  by  Presi- 


44        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

dent  Wilson;  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  for  Great 
Britain;  Monsieur  Loucheur,  for  France; 
Marquis  Imperiali,  for  Italy 

will  be  appointed  to  draft  a  plan  of  agreement 
concerning  the  Occupation  of  the  Rhineland 
Provinces,  in  accordance  with  the  scheme  sug- 
gested (skeleton  plan)  in  a  letter  dated  May  27, 
1919,  from  Mr.  Noyes,  American  Delegate  to  the 
Interallied  Rhineland  Commission,  to  President 
Wilson." 

It  also  contains  a  copy  of  the  letter, 
which  I  will  quote  since  it  states  my  posi- 
tion at  that  time ;  a  position  which  I  havfe 
since  seen  no  reason  to  alter. 

"American  Commission 
to  Negotiate  Peace 

"Paris,  May  27,  1919. 

' '  To  the  Honorable  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
11,  Place  des  Etats-Unis,  Paris. 

"Dear  Sir: 

"After  a  month  spent  in  the  Rhineland  as 
American  Commissioner,  I  feel  there  is  danger 
that  a  disastrous  mistake  will  be  made.     The 


MILITARY  OCCUrATION  45 

'Convention'  for  the  government  of  these  terri- 
tories, as  drafted  by  the  military  representatives 
of  the  Supreme  War  Council  on  May  eleventh,  is 
more  brutal,  I  beleve,  than  even  its  authors  de- 
sire upon  second  thought.  It  provides  for  un- 
endurable oppression  of  six  million  people  dur- 
ing a  period  of  years. 

"This  'Convention'  is  not  likely  to  be  adopted 
without  great  modification.  What  alarms  me, 
however,  is  that  none  of  the  revisions  of  this  doc- 
ument which  I  have  seen  recognize  that  its  basic 
principle  is  bad — that  the  quartering  of  an  en- 
emy army  in  a  country  as  its  master  in  time  of 
peace  and  the  billeting  of  troops  on  the  civil  pop- 
ulation will  insure  hatred  and  ultimate  disaster. 

"I  have  discussed  this  matter  at  length  with 
the  American  Commanders  of  the  Army  of  Oc- 
cupation, men  who  have  seen  military  occupation 
at  close  range  for  six  months.  These  officers  em- 
phatically indorse  the  above  statements.  They 
say  that  an  occupying  army,  even  one  with  the 
best  intentions,  is  guilty  of  outrages  and  that 
mutual  irritation,  in  spite  of  every  effort  to  the 
contrary,  grows  apace.  Force  and  more  force 
must  inevitably  be  the  history  of  such  occupa- 
tion long  continued. 

"Forgetting  the  apparent  ambitions  of  the 
French  and  possibly  overlooking  political  limita- 


4G         WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

tions,  I  have  sketched  below  a  plan  which  seems 
to  me  the  maximum  for  military  domination  in 
the  Rhineland  after  the  signing  of  peace.  Our 
Army  Commanders  and  others  who  have  studied 
the  subject  on  the  ground  agree  with  this  pro- 
gram: 

"Skeleton  Plan 

**I.  As  few  troops  as  possible  concentrated 
in  barracks  or  reserve  areas  with  no 
'billeting,'  excepting  possibly  for  offi- 
cers. 

"II.     Complete  self-government  for  the  ter- 
ritory, with  the  exceptions  below. 

"III.     A  Civil  Commission  with  powers: 

"a.  To  make  regulations  or  change 
old  ones  whenever  German  law 
or  actions — 

(1)  Threaten    the    carrying    out    of 

Treaty  terms,  or 

(2)  Threaten  the  comfort  or  security 

of  troops. 
"&.  To  authorize  the  army  to  take 
the  control  under  martial  law, 
either  in  danger  spots  or 
throughout  the  territory  Avhen- 
ever    conditions    seem    to    the 


MILITARY  OCCUPATION  47 

Commission  to  make  this  neces- 
sary. 

"Very  truly  yours, 
(Signed)     "Pierrepont  B.  No  yes, 

"American  Delegate, 
"Interallied  Rhineland  Commission." 

The  negotiations  which  resulted  in  this 
plan  being  adopted  are  of  special  interest 
to  any  one  studying  the  international  psy- 
chology of  the  past  two  years.  It  is  his- 
tory now  that  M.  Clemenceau  on  May  29th 
seized  upon  this  more  liberal  plan  of  **  oc- 
cupation" presented  by  President  Wilson 
in  order  to  make  more  sure  of  the  final  ad- 
hesion of  the  American  and.  British  Pre- 
miers to  the  main  principle  of  **  occupa- 
tion. ' '  Sitting  in  the  meetings  at  the  Quai 
d'Orsai  as  a  spectator,  I  witnessed  the 
most  intense  and  persistent  hostility  to 
this  '^civilian"  plan  on  the  part  of  Mar- 
echal  Foch  and  his  aids.  During  recent 
months  leading  French  statesmen  and  the 
French  press  have  bewailed  the  weakness 
which  yielded  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  liberal- 
ism. It  is  loudly  maintained  that  since  the 
compromise  was  made  in  view  of  active 


48        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

American  participation  and  a  defensive  al- 
liance, a  way  should  now  be  found  to  get 
back  to  that  sterner  control  originally 
planned,  and  by  doing  away  with  the  inter- 
ference of  the  InteraUied  High  Commis- 
sion which  "has  continually  opposed 
French  interests"  ensure  success  for  the 
new  French  policy. 

I  was  the  American  member  of  the  Com- 
mission from  its  creation  until  June  of  this 
year.  The  President  of  the  Commission, 
M.  Paul  Tirard,  is  a  forward-looking,  con- 
scientious man  who  has  worked  with  the 
other  members  to  carry  out  the  details  of 
the  ''Rhineland  Agreement"  in  the  spirit 
intended  by  the  Supreme  Council.  He  has 
succeeded  as  well  as  any  man  could  sur- 
rounded by  an  intensely  military  atmos- 
phere and  under  the  pressure  of  a  French 
national  policy  steadily  swinging  toward 
aggressive  military  and  political  action. 

I  believe  that  in  the  Rhineland  a  hostile 
military  occupation  is  seen  at  its  best;  and 
at  its  best,  I  can  say  from  personal  obser- 
vation, it  is  brutal ;  it  is  provocative ;  it  is 
continuing  war. 


MILITARY  OCCUrATION  49 

A  temporary  occupation  was,  as  I  have 
said,  inevitable,  and  its  continuance  until 
the  disarmament  of  Germany  has  pro- 
ceeded to  a  point  satisfactory  to  the  allies 
is  probably  desirable,  but  its  maintenance 
as  a  debt-collecting  agency  through  15 
years  is  unthinkable — it  will  be  a  running 
sore.  America  is  to-day  participating  in 
this  '^ occupation"  with  more  troops  than 
any  nation  excepting  France,  and  yet  we 
have  elected  to  place  entirely  outside  of 
our  own  influence  the  character  of  the  '  *  oc- 
cupation" and  the  length  of  its  continu- 
ance. During  the  14  months  in  which  I 
worked  as  a  member  of  the  Rhineland  Com- 
mission, I  became  daily  more  shocked  that 
any  responsible  man  should  be  willing  to 
curse  the  world  with  such  a  hatred  and 
war  breeding  institution  as  this.  I  could 
multiply  the  details  until  every  American 
would  be  equally  shocked,  but  I  will  leave  it 
to  the  imagination  of  my  readers  to  decide 
for  themselves  what  would  be  the  ultimate 
result  of  a  15-year  occupation  of  the  New 
England  states  by  victorious  German  or 
other  foreign  troops. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS  INSTI- 
GATED BY  THE  FRENCH 

After  the  war  there  was  a  general  con- 
viction in  France,  as  there  was  in  all  allied 
countries,  that  a  political  separation  of  the 
Rhine  Provinces  from  Prussia  would  be  in 
the  interest  of  future  peace.  Dominated 
by  Prussia  the  German  Empire  had 
plunged  the  world  into  war.  Hence,  it 
seemed  probable  that  strengthening  the 
power  of  the  other  German  states  and 
weakening  the  influence  of  Prussia  in  the 
German  Reich  would  tend  to  eliminate  the 
Hohenzollern  dream  of  world  conquest. 
Unfortunately,  this  scheme  of  political  re- 
adjustment, which  was  looked  upon  with 
favor  by  many  Germans,  easily  formed  the 
basis  in  France  for  the  more  radical  plan 
ot  an  independent  Rhineland  which  should 
act  as  a  '' buffer  state."  And  in  the  upper 
50  > 


GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS        51 

hierarchy  of  French  nationalism  and  miU- 
tarism  the  thinlj^  veiled  expectation  that 
this  ** buffer  state"  would  be  under  French 
influence  became  a  definite  determination 
to  make  the  Rhineland  ultimately  French 
territory.  A  few  months'  experience  with 
''occupation"  in  the  Rhineland  and  the  un- 
limited power  possessed  by  an  occupying 
army  made  this  plan  of  annexation  seem 
feasible.  In  the  end  it  tempted  even  those 
Moderates,  Avho  were  at  first  inclined  to 
look  askance  at  a  policy  likely  to  cre- 
ate another  Alsace-Lorraine,  to  approve 
French  efforts  for  a  "frontier  on  the 
Rhine." 

A  brief  account  of  the  Separatist  plots 
fomented  by  the  French  in  the  Rhineland 
during  the  past  eighteen  months  will  add  a 
point  of  definiteness  to  my  statement  that 
a  15-year  hostile  "occupation"  is  certain 
to  prove  a  curse  to  the  world.  It  ^vill  also 
suggest  in  general  the  part  America  must 
play,  if  Europe  in  the  20th  century  is  to 
be  anything  but  a  powder  magazine  of  dan- 
gerous possibilities. 

While  I  was  in  the  Rhineland  four  open 


52        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

attempts  at  secession  were  made.  These 
were  of  two  kinds.  Three  of  them  were 
roughly  similar  in  principle  to  the  demand 
of  our  Southern  Slates  during  the  50 's  for 
** State  rights."  The  fourth  attempt  was 
bald  '^ secession." 

Curiously  enough  the  two  most  ambi- 
tious attempts  revealed  a  conflict  between 
two  opposing  French  policies  striving  for 
success  under  the  leadership  of  two  rival 
French  Generals.  The  declaration  of 
''The  Palatinate  as  an  independent  neu- 
tral Republic"  on  May  21,  1919,  was  a 
bold  bid  by  General  Gerard,  Commander 
of  the  French  8th  Army,  for  success  in  Ms 
extreme  policy  of  dismembering  Germany. 
Official  France  was  at  that  time  swinging 
over  to  the  slower  and  more  subtle  policy 
of  General  Mangin  (Commander  of  the 
French  10th  Army)  and  it  was  hinted  at 
the  time  that  General  Gerard  already  knew 
of  his  own  impending  recall  and  that  he 
precipitated  this  flare-up  as  a  last  gamble. 
At  any  rate,  he  made  the  action  sharp  and 
snappy  and  he  was  recalled  a  short  time 
after  his  attempt  failed.    His  army  was 


GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS        53 

then  added  to  the  command  of  General 
Mangin. 

Proclamation  of  this  new  Palatinate  Re- 
public, which  was  to  be  entirely  independ- 
ent of  Germany,  was  posted  on  the  night  of 
the  21st  of  May,  and  on  the  22d  General 
Gerard  issued  a  Manifesto,  a  copy  of  which 
I  have  seen.  The  following  is  a  quotation 
from  this  document: 

"It  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  General  in 
command  of  the  French  Army  that  the  Landau 
population  owing  to  their  sympathetic  senti- 
ments towards  France  had  to  undergo  certain 
annoyances  on  the  part  of  German  officials. 
Such  actions  from  the  side  of  these  officials  con- 
stitute a  misuse  of  power  of  authority  and  are 
'A  breach  of  orders,  of  Marechal  Foch  as  well  as 
an  incorrect  action  towards  the  victorious  and 
benevolent  France. '  ' ' 

The  Manifesto  also  contained  a  declara- 
tion that  the  French  Commander  of  the 
Occupation  of  the  Palatinate  would  sup- 
port in  every  way  all  attempts  for  the  crea- 
tion of  a  Palatinate  Republic  in  connection 
with  France. 


54        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

During  the  next  few  days  there  were 
riots  in  Speyer,  Landau  and  Zweibrucken. 
Regierung's  President,  Winterstein,  was 
removed  from  office  and  expelled  from  the 
territory  by  the  French.  Other  officials 
hostile  to  the  Separatists  were  arrested. 
This  ''revolution"  was  too  artificial  and 
too  premature  for  any  chance  of  success. 
It  could  not  compete  with  the  more  moder- 
ate and  carefully  planned  scheme  for  a 
larger  Ehineland  Republic  within  the  Ger- 
man Reich  which  was  at  the  same  time  de- 
veloping under  the  management  of  Dr. 
Dorten  and  General  Mangin. 

This  latter  movement,  usually  referred  to 
as  the  ''Dorten  Rebellion,"  was  much  more 
ambitious  territorially  than  any  of  the  oth- 
ers. Not  only  the  five  "Rhine  Provinces" 
were  to  be  included  in  the  new  Republic, 
but  it  was  expected  to  comprise  most  of 
Hesse-Nassau,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse, 
the  Bavarian  Palatinate  and  the  rich  prov- 
ince of  Westphalia  across  the  Rhine,  in 
which  are  located  the  great  manufacturing 
industries  of  Essen  and  the  coal  mines  of 
the  Ruhr.    Final  plans  for  the  revolution 


GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS        'jo 

were  perfected  at  a  conference  in  Mayence 
attended  by  General  Mangin,  the  French 
Commander;  Dr.  Dorten,  a  Mr.  Kuchkoff 
of  Cologne,  Frohberger,  a  newspaper  ed- 
itor, and  several  other  Germans. 

About  2  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  May  22d 
a  French  Lieutenant-Colonel  from  General 
Mangin 's  Headquarters  arrived  in  Co- 
blenz.  He  managed  to  get  the  American 
Chief  of  Staff  on  the  telephone  and  in- 
sisted on  an  immediate  interview  with  the 
American  Commanding  General.  He  was 
very  urgent.  The  conference,  however, 
was  postponed  until  morning  when  the 
French  officer  informed  the  Americans  that 
on  Saturday,  the  24th,  a  Republic  would  be 
proclaimed  with  Coblenz  as  its  capital. 
He  gave  the  names  of  the  men  who  would 
form  the  new  Cabinet  and  stated  that  fifty 
officials  of  the  new  administration  were 
then  on  their  way  to  Coblenz  to  organize 
the  government.  The  new  state  was  to  re- 
main for  the  present  a  part  of  the  German 
Empire,  but  later  would  be  made  wholly  in- 
dependent. He  stated  that  he  was  sent  by 
General  Mangin  to  solicit  the  aid  of  the 


50         WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

American  General  in  promoting  this  move- 
ment. 

Our  Commanding  General  replied  that 
the  *' occupation"  was  governed  by  the 
terms  of  the  armistice,  that  an  honest  car- 
rying out  of  those  terms  would  not  permit 
the  '' occupying"  authorities  to  recognize 
revolutionary  movements,  that  this  had 
been  the  policy  of  all  the  allies,  and  that  in 
any  case  his  own  instructions  from  Gen- 
eral Pershing  were  positive.  He  courte- 
ously refused  to  permit  the  Coblenz  part 
of  the  program  to  be  carried  out  in  any 
way. 

We  found  that  fifty  billets  had  been  actu- 
ally engaged  for  the  Dorten  officials  by  the 
French  Mission  in  Coblenz,  and  it  turned 
out  that  carloads  of  proclamations  had 
been  printed  and  were  ready  for  distribu- 
tion. 

With  its  proposed  ''Capital"  in  the 
hands  of  the  "Ober-Prasident"  and  the  of- 
ficials of  the  old  regime,  and  with  the  for- 
bidden American  area  lying  like  a  wedge 
between  Mayence  and  the  rich  provinces 
to   the   north,   the   ''Dorten   Revolution" 


GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS        57 

hung  fire  for  a  week.  The  conspiracy, 
however,  had  gone  too  far  to  be  halted. 
On  June  1st  the  Republic  was  finally  ''de- 
clared"; proclamations  were  posted  in  all 
Occupied  territory  excepting  the  Ameri- 
can area.  Wiesbaden  was  announced  as 
the  temporary  capital;  Dr.  Dorten  pro- 
claimed himself  as  the  Chief  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  and  appealed  to  the 
Peace  Conference  at  Paris  to  recognize  the 
new  State  and  to  protect  the  authors  of  the 
movement  from  punishment  for  treason. 
Evidence  that  the  "Revolution"  had  no 
popular  support  began  to  come  from  every 
direction.  Even  before  the  1st  of  June  the 
revolutionary  plans  had  leaked  out  and 
strikes  and  other  demonstrations  of  pro- 
test were  organized  by  the  population  in 
various  cities.  When  the  Dorten  Cabinet 
was  announced  the  list  of  names  was  found 
to  be  quite  different  from  that  brought  to 
Coblenz  in  the  early  morning  hours  of  the 
22d  of  May.  Not  one  prominent  member 
of  the  Centrum  party,  to  which  belong  a 
large  majority  of  the  Rhinelanders,  was  in 
the  new  Cabinet.    In  many  places  the  proc- 


58        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

lamations  were  torn  down  by  the  inhabi- 
tants. On  the  3d  of  June  a  counter-proc- 
lamation appeared  in  the  German  newspa- 
pers bitterly  denouncing  the  **  discord 
shown  in  the  rsmks  of  the  Rhinelanders  in 
this  the  hardest  hour  of  the  German  Ee- 
public,"  and  signed  by  the  Rhineland  rep- 
resentatives of  six  of  the  great  national 
parties  headed  by  the  Centrum  party. 

On  the  4th  of  June  Dr.  Dorten  was  "es- 
corted" and  the  other  Ministers  were 
''ejected"  from  the  Regierung's  building 
in  Wiesbaden,  the  latter  being  very 
roughly  handled  by  the  populace  waiting 
outside.  This  practically  ended  the  "first 
Dorten  Rebellion,"  It  never  had  a  chance 
of  success  unless  backed  by  allied  bayo- 
nets. Soon  after  June  4th  the  doctor  is- 
sued a  statement  in  which  he  naively  an- 
nounced that  he  would  "permit  the  old  of- 
ficials to  remain  in  office  for  the  present." 
The  net  result  was  to  effectually  kill  the 
sentiment  favorable  to  separation  from 
Prussia  which  had  undoubtedly  existed 
amongst  the  Germans  of  the  Rhineland. 
Since  then,  the  separation  from  Prussia 


GERMAN  "SEPARATIST"  MOVEMENTS        59 

has  meant  to  the  average  Ehinelander  a 
first  step  toward  becoming  a  province  of 
France.    He  is  afraid  of  it. 

The  failure  of  the  policy  entrusted  to 
General  Mangin  and  the  need  of  a  different 
policy  which  should  quiet  the  fears  of  the 
German  population  became  so  evident  that 
General  Mangin  was  recalled  a  little  later, 
and  General  Degoutte,  a  man  inspiring 
confidence  in  every  American  who  meets 
him,  was  placed  in  command  of  the  French 
**  occupying '  ^  forces.  It  is  significant  that 
afterwards  during  the  enthusiasm  aroused 
by  the  ''occupation"  of  Frankfort  the 
Paris  journals  urged  that  General  Mangin 
replace  General  Degoutte  in  Mayence. 
Some  of  the  papers  even  published  rumors 
that  the  Government  had  decided  to  make 
this  change. 

Dr.  Dorten  is  still  conspiring  and  has 
been  repeatedly  protected  from  official  and 
unofficial  persecution.  He  can  bide  his 
time,  for  French  troops  are  scheduled  to 
stay  in  the  Ehineland  at  least  fifteen  years, 
and  M.  Millerand  has  declared  French  in- 
dependence of  Anglo-Saxon  policies.    The 


§0        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACK 

demand  for  occupation  of  the  Ruhr  (which 
was  temporarily  negatived  last  April  by 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  note  regarding  the 
Frankfort  invasion)  grows  louder  and 
louder  in  France.  It  is  hinted  that  the 
bait  of  a  Ehine-Westphalian  state, 
strengthened  economically  at  the  expense 
of  the  rest  of  Germany  by  the  coal  of  the 
Ruhr  and  the  steel  production  of  Essen, 
will  bring  a  majority  of  the  German  popu- 
lation to  support  the  next  revolution. 

No  power  but  the  United  States  can  halt 
the  present  march  of  events,  which  prom- 
ises to  make  France  temporarily  the  mili- 
tary master  of  Europe,  while  the  peace  of 
the  world  becomes  "a  house  of  cards." 


CHAPTER  IX 

IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE 

Prophecy  is  always  dangerous.  It  is  es- 
pecially liable  to  error  of  detail  when,  as 
in  the  present  European  tangle,  a  thousand 
factors  are  working  in  obscure  relations  to 
each  other  toward  the  same  general  re- 
sult. That  disaster  is  imminent  no  one 
can  doubt,  but  it  is  beyond  the  power  of 
the  keenest  vision  to  predict  what  form 
the  catastrophe  will  take.  If  the  brakes  of 
an  automobile  give  way  on  a  steep  hill,  it 
is  impossible  to  predict  in  advance  what 
kind  of  a  smash  there  will  be.  The  ma- 
chine may  turn  over,  climb  a  telegraph  pole 
or  run  into  another  auto,  but  in  spite  of 
uncertainty  as  to  where  and  when  and 
how  the  catastrophe  will  come,  there  is  no 
uncertainty  as  to  the  fact  that  it  is  inevi- 
table. 

In  every  European  country  financial  in- 
solvency, economic  stagnation,  unemploy- 
61 


62        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

ment,  starvation,  misery,  and  social  demor- 
alization have  been  reacting  upon  each 
other  with  deadly  effect  during  the  past 
year.  These  conditions  are  shaping  the 
daily  development  of  European  politics, 
and  those  who  have  seen  their  effects  near 
at  hand  have  no  doubt  that  there  must  be 
a  tragic  conclusion.  So  interlaced  are  the 
many  factors,  and  so  interacting  are  their 
causes  and  effects,  that  one  can  with  diffi- 
culty classify  them  for  intelligent  analysis. 
The  most  obvious  factors  can  perhaps  be 
grouped  under  two  headings — economic 
and  military.  The  facts  I  have  already 
given  showing  economic  conditions  in  Eu- 
rope suggest  that  there  is  a  ^'jumping-off 
place"  in  the  financial  road  not  far  ahead. 
A  British  authority  recently  asserted  that 
**the  whole  of  Europe  to-day  is  produc- 
ing not  over  one-half  it  is  consuming." 
This  may  be  an  exaggeration.  When  I  re- 
peated the  statement  to  Dr.  Leach,  an 
American  who  has  spent  all  his  time  dur- 
ing the  past  two  years  on  official  business 
in  Italy,  Servia,  Poland  and  the  other  coun- 
tries of  Eastern  Europe,  he  was  very  pos- 


IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE  63 

itive  that  it  was  not  exaggerated.  He 
may  have  been  over-impressed  with  life  in 
those  smaller  countries  which  for  more 
than  a  year  have  fought  much  and  pro- 
duced little  or  nothing.  The  announced 
fact,  however,  that  France,  herself,  dur- 
ing the  first  six  months  of  this  year  im- 
ported $1,414,000,000  worth  of  merchan- 
dise more  than  she  exported  tends  to 
confirm  the  Englishman's  statement. 

Until  the  United  States  comes  to  the  res- 
cue the  nations  of  Europe,  like  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Mark  Twain's  village,  must  con- 
tinue their  present  attempt  to  ''live  by  tak- 
ing in  each  other's  washing."  Where  this 
financial  jugglery,  which  is  partially  con- 
cealing the  helplessness  of  Europe,  will 
end,  and  when  it  will  end,  is  hard  to  pre- 
dict. That  it  will  end  in  a  crash  is  cer- 
tain, although  it  is  possible  the  economic 
catastrophe  will  be  obscured  by  an  earlier 
social  or  political  debacle. 

More  than  half  the  free  gold  of  the  world 
has  been  shifted  to  the  United  States.  We 
have  the  lion's  share  of  raw  materials  and 
if  we  do  not  quickly  restore,  at  least  par- 


(M        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

tially,  the  world's  financial  balance,  our 
possession  of  the  materials  needed  by  Eu- 
rope plus  our  monopoly  of  the  gold  and 
credit,  without  which  she  is  unable  to  pay 
us  for  those  materials,  will  react  with  tell- 
ing effect  on  our  own  economic  life. 

The  huge  favorable  balance  of  our  for- 
eign trade  during  the  past  eight  months 
has  undoubtedly  involved  large  private 
credits  from  America  to  Europe,  princi- 
pally to  England,  but  these  temporary 
loans  are  mere  palliatives.  They  tend  ul- 
timately to  increase  the  difficulties  of  Eu- 
ropean buyers  by  forcing  down  exchange. 
Organized  governmental  supervision  of 
credits  and  exchange  can  alone  make  pos- 
sible continued  American  exports  on  a 
scale  sufficient  to  start  industrial  revival 
in  Europe. 

It  is,  however,  the  recent  political  devel- 
opments in  Europe  which  give  us  a  real 
glimpse,  as  it  were,  of  the  future.  Here 
one  need  not  tax  his  imagination  with 
prophecy.  The  reactionary  militaristic 
movement  which  started,  after  America's 
intention  to  dissolve  partnership  with  Eu- 


IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE  65 

rope  seemed  certain,  and  which  has  made 
such  insidious  progress  during  the  past 
few  months,  points  the  moral  of  our  de- 
linquency and  suggests  its  tragic  conse- 
quences. 

Belgium  has  been  recently  persuaded  to 
sign  a  treaty  with  France,  by  the  terms  of 
which  she  agrees  to  maintain  a  field  army 
of  500,000  men  as  compared  with  100,000 
men  before  the  war. 

Italy  has  exchanged  the  liberalism  of 
Premier  Nitti  for  the  extreme  nationalism 
of  Giolotti.    Nitti  recently  declared — 

"I  do  not  know  if  there  is  peace  anywhere  in 
the  world,  but  there  certainly  is  none  in  Europe. 
Around  you,  you  see  nothing  but  armies.  While 
the  war  was  still  going  on  people  said  this  would 
be  the  last  war,  but  Germany's  militarist  spirit 
has  been  acquired  by  the  peoples  who  overthrew 
Germany.  Europe  is  alive  with  proposals  of 
conquest,  with  eagerness  to  hoard  raw  mate- 
rials." 

Giolotti,  who  succeeded  Nitti  as  Premier, 
concluded  at  Aix  les  Bains  in  September  a 
secret  agreement  with  France.    Fiume  as 


66         WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

well  as  the  Dalmatian  coast  will  pass  ulti- 
mately to  Italy,  depriving  the  Jugo-Slavs 
of  access  to  the  sea.  In  return,  Italy  will 
never  repeat  her  former  protest  against 
the  French  invasion  of  Frankfort. 

Poland,  dazzled  by  hopes  of  more  terri- 
tory, has  cheerfully  turned  to  military  con- 
quest those  energies  which,  if  she  is  to  re- 
main an  independent  nation,  should  be  con- 
centrated on  her  well-nigh  hopeless  inter- 
nal problems.  The  Poles  are  a  brave  peo- 
ple. They  have  preserved  their  national 
hopes  through  centuries  of  discourage- 
ment. Unfortunately  their  genius  seems 
better  adapted  to  war  than  to  peace.  Po- 
litically they  are  ''many  men  of  many 
minds"  and  they  have  never  developed 
that  capacity  for  compromise  which  has 
made  democracy  in  other  countries  pos- 
sible. M.  Paderewski  struggled  for  more 
than  a  year  to  form  a  stable  government. 
He  finally  resigned  the  Premiership  and 
left  Poland  a  broken-hearted  man.  Six- 
teen political  parties  are  struggling  for 
mastery  in  the  Provisional  Parliament  of 
Poland.    After  a  year  of  discussion  not 


IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE  67 

even  the  introduction  to  the  proposed  Na- 
tional Constitution  has  been  agreed  upon. 
Considering  the  industrial  prostration  of 
Poland  and  her  chaotic  political  condition, 
the  encouragement  given  by  France  to  Pol- 
ish military  adventure  seems  very  regret- 
table. 

And  France — France  is  congratulating 
herself  on  the  return  to  a  '  *  continental  pol- 
icy"; M.  Millerand  has  been  elected  Pres- 
ident of  the  Republic  with  unanimous  ac- 
claim. Militaristic  statesmen  and  journal- 
ists loudly  assert  that  he  has  rescued 
France,  and  with  her  all  of  Europe,  from 
the  Anglo-Saxon  peace  domination  to 
which  M.  Clemenceau  yielded  so  weakly. 
Through  the  Belgian  Treaty  of  alliance, 
through  the  Italian  ''Agreement"  of  Aix 
les  Bains,  and  through  the  establishment  of 
a  French  dominated  military  Poland  on 
G'ermany's  eastern  frontier,  he  has  made 
France  for  the  moment  what  Germany  was 
before  the  war — the  dominating  military 
power  of  Europe. 

The  well-known  American  war  corres- 
pondent, Frank  Simonds,  in  a  long  newspa- 


68        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

per  article  dated  September  26,  congratu- 
lates the  French  nation  on  its  final  disen- 
tanglement from  the  peace  propositions  of 
Wilson  and  Lloyd  George.  He  concludes 
— **A11  in  all,  the  French  situation  is  better 
diplomatically  speaking  than  at  any  time 
since  the  armistice,  and  this  is  due  unmis- 
takably to  the  return  of  Millerand  to  the 
system  which  Clemenceau  endeavored  to 
follow  at  the  Paris  Conference  but  aban- 
doned under  Anglo-Saxon  pressure." 
This  popular  writer  sums  up  the  blessings 
conferred  on  France  by  the  Millerand  di- 
plomacy as  follows :  ' '  She  has  finally  sub- 
stituted a  Continental  for  an  Anglo-Saxon 
policy — she  has  regained  her  freedom  of 
action  by  her  old-fashioned  bargains  with 
the  Belgians,  the.  Poles  and  the  Italians. '  * 
Yet  this  same  correspondent  was  eighteen 
months  ago  writing  from  Europe  the  most 
fervent  hopes  for  the  new  Internationalism 
and  the  most  fulsome  praise  of  the  peace 
ideals  of  President  Wilson  and  Lloyd 
George. 
I  have  no  quarrel  with  this   writer's 


IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE  68 

change  of  opinion.  I  have  quoted  him 
merely  to  emphasize  by  contrast  the 
change  in  European  opinion  as  well  as  pol- 
icy which  has  taken  place  since  America 
withdrew  from  the  European  **  settle- 
ment." It  is  another  stage  passed  in 
weaning  the  war-weary  masses  of  Europe 
from  those  idealists  who  seemed  all-power- 
ful at  the  end  of  1918.  In  America  as  well 
our  people  have  been  almost  persuaded 
that  we  may  well  leave  European  affairs 
alone.  It  now  only  remains  to  convince 
them  that  it  will  save  us  much  expense  and 
trouble  if  France  will  reorganize  Europe 
on  the  old  system  of  military  alliances, 
** strategic  frontiers"  and  ''balance  of 
power,"  which  has  for  hundreds  of  years 
given  men  of  ''blood  and  iron"  a  chance  to 
show  their  worth. 

It  was  just  so  that  Metternich,  after  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  finding  himself  unable  to 
directly  oppose  the  demand  for  a  new  In- 
ternationalism, gave  way  at  first  and  then 
with  consummate  skill  led  the  unpractical 
idealists  gradually  around  a  circle  to  that 


TO       WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

Imperialistic  peace  which  made  possible 
Bismarck,  Hindenburg  and  the  great  world 
war. 

Now  as  then,  the  friends  of  peace  are 
silenced,  and  on  the  Continent,  at  least, 
there  is  little  chance  they  will  be  heard 
from  again  unless  America,  by  joining  the 
League  of  Nations,  reopens  the  discus- 
sion. All  the  cynics,  pessimists  and  sin- 
cere militarists  of  Europe  are  rejoicing 
with  the  French  over  the  successful  launch- 
ing of  the  Millerand  policy. 

But  what  a  prospect!  Such  a  military 
combination  maj^  bring  glory — for  the  mo- 
ment— it  may  bring  revenge,  but  it  cannot 
bring  safety.  Looked  at  even  from  the 
Chauvinist's  viewpoint,  this  reenthrone- 
ment  of  the  god  of  war  is  sure  to  prove 
a  Frankenstein.  Consider  the  situation. 
A  war-ruined  France,  with  the  aid  of  lit- 
tle Belgium,  poverty-stricken  Italy,  and 
deluded  Poland,  sets  up  a  military  domina- 
tion of  Europe,  while  a  Brobdingnagian 
Russia  struggling  sullenly  toward  re- 
birth nurses  an  ever  growing  desire  for  re- 
venge, and  a  Germany  more  powerful  po- 


IF  WE  ABANDON  EUROPE  71 

tentially  than  this  new  military  alliance 
awaits  her  opportunity.  One  hundred  and 
sixty  million  Slavs  will  soon  emerge  from 
that  same  melting  pot  which  gave  Napo- 
leon his  unconquerable  armies  and,  backed, 
it  may  be,  by  untold  millions  of  Asiatics, 
will  find  a  Europe  returned  to  the  doctrine 
of  ** blood  and  iron."  They  may  find  a 
Germany  driven  by  desperation  into  their 
partnership.  Whether  Europe  is  to  suffer 
a  Bolshevik  inundation  or  face  the  chal- 
lenge of  a  Napoleonic  conquest,  the  stage 
is  certainly  being  set  for  a  conflagration 
from  which  the  United  States  will  be  un- 
able to  stand  aloof. 

No  one  can  predict  the  exact  nature  of 
the  catastrophe  now  rushing  upon  Europe, 
but  a  catastrophe  is  inevitable  and  not  far 
away,  unless  we  bring  to  Europe  our  finan- 
cial support  and  the  irresistible  moral  lead- 
ership which  this  support  insures. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

During  the  last  week  of  July,  1914,  when 
a  world  war  seemed  inevitable,  Lord  Grey 
endeavored  to  improvise  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. It  was  then  too  late.  Afterwards, 
through  all  the  agonies  of  the  great  strug- 
gle, people  fed  their  courage  on  talk  of  a 
league  to  prevent  future  wars, — a  '  *  League 
of  Nations"  which  should  be  organized  as 
soon  as  peace  were  come ;  and  we,  in  Amer- 
ica, talked  of  this  louder  than  any  of  the 
rest. 

During  the  first  six  months  of  the  armis- 
tice we  showed  every  sign  of  making  good, 
not  only  on  our  moral  obligation  to  Eu- 
rope, but  on  our  definite  assurance  given 
during  the  war  to  four  million  young 
Americans  and  to  their  parents,  that  this 
should  be  a  ''war  to  end  wars."  Every 
one  then  regarded  the  character  of  the 

72 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  73 

"settlement"  as  of  equal  importance  with 
winning  the  war. 

At  the  Peace  Conference  the  executive 
half  of  our  government  joined  in  creating 
the  plan  for  a  new  kind  of  peace,  and  Eu- 
rope, never  dreaming  that  America  was 
capable  of  deserting  in  the  hour  of  need, 
let  President  Wilson  build  into  this  new 
international  structure  the  best  of  Ameri- 
can ideals.  Often  in  Paris,  when  states- 
men hesitated,  the  people  themselves  forced 
their  representatives  to  follow  American 
leadership.  The  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  is  in  the  main  a  statement  of  old 
American  ideals.  By  the  same  token,  its 
practicability  was  always  dependent  upon 
the  United  States  taking  a  leading  part 
in  its  execution,  especially  during  the  crit- 
ical period  of  its  infancy. 

The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
is  neither  complete  nor  perfect.  No  one 
pretends  that  it  is.  It  was  built  as  a 
bridge, — primarily  as  a  bridge  over  which 
a  ruined  world  might  pass  from  the  chaos 
of  war  to  peace  and  early  reconstruction. 
But  beyond,  it  was  to  be  a  bridge  leading 


74        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

from  the  wom-ont  mediaeval  system  of  na- 
tional isolation,  selfishness  and  intrigue 
which  produced  the  war,  to  a  better  world 
where  peace  should  be  the  joint  responsi- 
bility of  all  civilized  peoples.  It  was  has- 
tily built,  for  its  creators  knew  that  only 
during  that  time  of  spiritual  exaltation  im- 
mediately following  the  war,  could  any  ef- 
fective start  be  made  toward  realizing  an 
ideal  so  contrary  to  the  political  habits  of 
mankind.  They  knew  that  if  this  chance 
were  missed,  the  centrifugal  force  of  hos- 
tile nationalism  would  postpone  any  prac- 
tical steps  for  a  League  until  war  was 
again  upon  us — and  again  it  was  too  late. 

In  the  story  of  the  '^Arkansas  Trav- 
eler,'^ the  ** cracker"  sitting  under  his 
leaky  roof  explained  that  when  it  didn't 
rain,  there  was  no  use  of  mending  it,  and 
when  it  rained,  he  couldn't  mend  it.  In 
times  of  peace,  the  need  of  a  League  seems 
small  compared  with  the  national  sacrifices 
entailed.    When  war  brews,  it  is  too  late. 

So  President  Wilson  and  the  most  far- 
seeing  of  the  European  statesmen  created 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  a 


THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  75 

Magna  Charta  of  the  new  internationalism, 
and  during  that  period  when  selfishness 
and  ambition  were  momentarily  stilled  by 
the  bitter  memories  of  war,  they  committed 
most  of  the  nations  of  the  world  to  its 
maintenance  and  development.  America's 
withdrawal  destroyed  their  work.  The 
League  of  Nations  still  exists,  but  in  name 
only.  It  is  a  bridge  with  the  central  arch 
— American  participation — gone. 

It  was  a  disingenuous  taunt  that  **the 
League  broke  down  at  its  first  test  in  Po- 
land." Every  one  knows  that  there  is  no 
effective  League  without  the  United  States. 
Certain  European  statesmen  are  bravely 
maintaining  its  shadow,  hoping  that  we 
will  come  in  at  the  last  and  make  it  a  real- 
ity, but  until  we  join,  the  League  is  help- 
less as  an  agency  for  controlling  the  wild 
horses  of  war. 

In  the  past,  Europe  has  looked  upon  our 
American  peace  ideals  as  Utopian.  There 
is  a  bitter  irony,  therefore,  in  this  somer- 
sault of  ours.  After  thirty-one  nations 
agreed  without  reservation  to  accept  the 
League's    slight    restrictions    upon    their 


76        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

right  to  make  war  ''at  the  drop  of  the  hat," 
the  United  States  refused. 

History  will  not  ask  who  was  responsible 
for  this  refusal.  If  we  persist,  America  as 
a  nation  will  for  all  time  stand  accused  at 
the  bar  of  civilization,  and  by  future  gen- 
erations of  Americans  as  well,  of  having 
deserted  its  allies  and  committed  a  crime 
against  the  peace  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  RESERVATIONS 

As  to  the  Senate  "reservations**  I  have 
never  been  able  to  satisfy  myself  regard- 
ing the  exact  aims  or  real  motives  which 
inspired  them.  I  have  read  and  re-read 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
with  the  ** reservations"  before  me.  I 
could  find  nothing  in  them  which  would 
stamp  as  foolish  or  unpatriotic  those  41 
nations  who  have  signed  without  reserva- 
tions. All  of  those  nations  have  constitu- 
tions essentially  the  same  as  ours,  at  least 
as  regards  the  responsibility  of  their  Par- 
liaments for  declaring  peace  and  war  or 
sending  troops  abroad.  No  one  in  any  of 
these  countries,  not  even  the  politician  who 
is  everywhere  seeking  political  capital,  has 
arisen  since  the  Covenant  was  signed  to 
accuse  his  Government  of  **  signing  away 
the  country's  freedom." 

7T 


78        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

In  general,  I  am  inclined  to  accept  Pres- 
ident Wilson's  statement  that — 

*  *  Those  who  drew  the  Covenant  of  the  Lea^e 
were  careful  that  it  should  contain  nothing  which 
interfered  with  or  impaired  the  constitutional 
arrangements  of  any  of  the  great  nations  which 
are  to  constitute  its  members. ' ' 

Does  it  not  seem  incredible  that  a  Peace 
Commission  in  which  the  best  legal  minds 
of  all  nations  joined  would  put  into  the 
most  important  document  ever  written — a 
document  on  which  the  peace  of  the  world 
must  hang  for  many  years — those  crude  at- 
tacks on  the  national  constitutions  of  its 
members  which  we  are  asked  to  believe  lie 
concealed  in  the  Covenant  of  the  League? 
And  suppose  the  provisions  of  this  docu- 
ment did  violate  our  Constitution.  It 
would  have  no  effect.  Their  inclusion 
might  hurt  the  Covenant — it  could  not 
tou(^h  our  Constitution.  Every  schoolboy 
knows  that  no  President  by  signing  and  no 
Congress  by  ratif>dng  any  agreement  can 
change  our  Constitution  one  iota.    It  can 


THE  RESERVATIONS  79 

be  changed  only  by  amendment  in  a  pre- 
scribed manner. 

The  claim  that  these  ** reservations" 
save  us  from  some  kind  of  slavery  to  Eu- 
rope— from  being  obliged  to  declare  war  or 
send  troops  abroad  against  our  will — seems 
ridiculous  in  view  of  the  perfectly  plain 
stipulations  in  the  Treaty  that  all  such  de- 
cisions must  be  by  unanimous  vote  of  the 
''council."  Since  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  also  provides  that  we  shall  always 
have  one  representative  in  the  council,  no 
important  action  can  be  taken  mthout  the 
vote  of  the  United  States.  In  Article  X 
the  signing  nations  agree  to  respect  each 
other's  territorial  integrity  and  independ- 
ence. In  case  of  violation,  the  action  of 
the  League  which,  as  noted  before,  must  be 
approved  by  the  American  representative, 
can  go  no  further  than  ''advising"  with 
the  principal  governments  as  to  what  ac- 
tion shall  be  taken. 

I  will  not  go  into  more  detail  since  the 
"reservations"  have  been  discussed  end- 
lessly in  the  public  press.    American  law- 


80        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

yers  invented  these  "reservations"  and 
lawj^ers  can  best  discuss  them.  My  own 
willingness  to  see  the  United  States  take  a 
chance  along  with  the  41  other  nations  is 
founded  on  certain  general  considerations. 
The  United  States  of  all  nations  can 
least  be  *' enslaved"  or  bullied  by  a  League 
of  Nations  of  which  it  is  a  member.  The 
idea  seems  laughable  to  one  who  has  expe- 
rienced the  overpowering,  not  to  say  un- 
due, influence  possessed  by  any  representa- 
tive of  America  sitting  in  European  coun- 
cils. American  power  and  material  wealth 
are  the  hope  of  Europe.  They  are  always 
increasing  as  compared  with  Europe.  If 
they  do  not  give  America  the  power  to 
bully  other  nations  they  certainly  insure 
that  anything  touching  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  will  be  suggested  only  after 
making  sure  it  will  be  agreeable  to  us.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  no  great  nation  is  or  ever 
will  be  bulHed  or  enslaved  by  fellow  mem- 
bers of  a  "  Peace  League. ' '  The  voluntary 
nature  of  a  League  of  Nations  obliges  it 
for  the  sake  of  self-preservation  to  respect 
the  feelings  and  interests  of  its  members. 


THE  RESERVATIONS  81 

As  I  said  before,  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  only  a  bridge.  It  is 
not  complete — it  is  a  skeleton  which  mostly 
expresses  principles  and  aspirations. 
Filling  in  the  details  necessary  to  make  a 
real  League  was  expected  to  follow  actual 
experience  and  later  discussion.  In  that 
process  of  building  a  League  the  United 
States  would  be  bomid  to  have  a  prepon- 
derant voice.  Certainly  on  matters  touch- 
ing  American  interests,  the  word  of  Amer- 
ica would  be  unchallenged.  The  League 
of  Nations  could  be  anything  we  chose  to 
make  it.  This  applies  to  new  details  still 
to  be  worked  out  as  well  as  old  implications 
which  we  might  wish  to  clear  up  in  such  a 
way  that  their  relation  to  our  laws  and  pol- 
icies would  be  surely  understood.  I  do  not 
believe  that  any  responsible  man  in  Amer- 
ica would  have  voted  to  withhold  our  aid 
from  dying  Europe  during  two  mortal 
years  had  he  realized  as  I  do,  and  as  every 
one  who  has  represented  American  inter- 
ests in  Europe  during  this  period  does, 
that  all  modifications  desired  by  the  people 
of  the  United  States  could  easily  have  been 


82        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

put  into  the  charter  of  the  League  in  plain 
language  at  its  first  session. 

If  the  Senators  were  unwilling  to  take 
this  chance,  President  Wilson  had  even 
greater  reason  to  doubt  the  possibility  of 
adding  to  the  Covenant  those  positive  reg- 
ulations which  he  regarded  as  the  very 
core  of  the  peace  guarantees,  if  they  were 
once  eliminated  by  the  terms  of  American 
ratification.  It  is  easier  to  tear  down  than 
to  build  up  in  such  cases.  Changes  such 
as  those  aimed  at  by  the  ''reservations'* 
which  tend  to  weaken  the  League  would 
meet  little  opposition  from  other  members, 
but  their  willingness  to  circumscribe  na- 
tional freedom  of  action  in  the  interest  of 
peace  was  at  its  maximum  when  the  Treaty 
was  signed  and  the  President  had  ample 
reason  to  fear  that  any  attempt  to 
strengthen  the  restrictive  provisions  at  a 
later  date  would  prove  fruitless. 

I  cannot,  however,  believe  that  the 
grounds  given  on  either  side  were  sufficient 
to  warrant  killing  the  Treaty  at  a  time 
when  the  need  of  immediate  American  par- 
ticipation was  so  evident  and  so  extreme. 


THE  RESERVATIONS  83 

Personally  I  would  have  preferred  ratifica- 
tion without  reservations,  leaving  **  clarifi- 
cation" to  be  effected  by  the  United  States 
after  it  became  a  member  of  the  League, 
but  I  regret  that  the  President  refused  to 
accept  the  modified  Treaty  when  it  became 
evident  that  the  choice  lay  between  ratifica- 
tion with  the  ''Lodge  reservations"  or  no 
ratification  at  all. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  "LABOR  SECTION"  OF  THE  TREATY 

It  has  been  suggested  to  me  that  the  Eu- 
ropean diplomat  is  again  back  **on  the 
job"  and  that  this  ancient  tribe  will  in- 
trigue as  of  old  until  war  is  the  only  solu- 
tion ;  so  that  neither  our  help  nor  that  of  a 
League  will  avail  to  prevent  war  as  long  as 
the  real  issues  are  in  the  hands  of  the  same 
type  of  men  who  have  played  the  game  for 
centuries.  It  may  be  admitted  that  ambi- 
tious, intriguing  statesmen  will  be  in  con- 
trol of  the  foreign  policies  of  many  Euro- 
pean nations,  but  a  new  force  has  appeared 
which  is  likely  to  change  very  materially 
the  course  of  events.  Labor  representing 
the  masses  in  every  country  has  become 
conscious  of  its  power — it  is  becoming  mili- 
tantly  conscious.  The  workers  know  full 
well  they  have  been  the  pawns  in  the  game 
of  international  intrigue  and  have  always 
been   the   losers   and   sufferers   by   war. 

84 


"LABOR.  SECTION"  OP  THE  TREATY         85 

They  have  had  the  will  and  they  are  now 
acquiring  the  power  to  say  "No"  to  their 
rulers.  I  believe  that  during  the  era  just 
ahead  labor  will  in  all  countries  paralyze 
the  hands  of  militaristic  politicians  and  its 
opinion  will  stand  as  a  valid  threat  and 
warning  to  statesmen,  such  as  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  who  heed  the  signs  of  the  times. 

My  confidence  in  the  possibility  of  build- 
ing at  this  time  a  real  League  of  Nations  is 
founded  upon  two  things — the  horror  of 
war  which  exists  among  the  masses  of  Eu- 
rope, and  the  emergence  of  labor  as  an 
effective  force  in  national  councils.  But 
why,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  is  it  necessary 
for  America  to  join  the  League  of  Nations 
and  participate  in  European  affairs'? 
Why  may  not  the  solution  be  left  entirely 
to  labor!  The  answer  is,  that  only  labor 
responsible  and  united  can  accomplish  any- 
thing. Without  our  stabilizing  influence 
at  this  moment,  labor  in  many  countries  is 
likely  to  acquire  Bolshevik  characteristics 
which  will  only  increase  the  difficulties  of 
the  world  settlement.  The  provisions  of 
the    ''Labor    Section"    of    the    Treaty, 


Sa        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

strengthened  by  our  adhesion,  will  be  a 
great  step  toward  peace  as  well  as  indus- 
trial justice.  In  Chapter  I  of  the  labor 
section,  a  permanent  conference  is  estab- 
lished for  the  improvement  of  labor  condi- 
tions, and  Articles  388-399  set  up  a  perma- 
nent organization  under  the  League  to  ac- 
complish the  objects  stated.  In  Article 
437  the  following  subjects  of  special  and 
urgent  importance  are  suggested  for  the 
attention  of  this  new  labor  conference : 

The  right  of  association. 

The  payment  of  an  adequate  wage. 

The  eight-hour  day. 

The  weekly  day  of  rest. 

The  abolition  of  child  labor. 

Equal  pay  for  women. 

The  conditions  of  labor. 

Here  we  find  a  benevolent  international- 
ization of  the  labor  movement  tied  tightly 
to  the  League  of  Nations.  This  will  tend 
to  unify  labor  conditions  in  competing 
countries;  it  should  give  a  constructive 
character  to  that  struggle  toward  fairer 


"LABOR  SECTION"  OF  THE  TREATY         87 

division  of  the  world's  prosperity  and  hap- 
piness, which  most  men  recognize  as  in- 
evitable and  desirable;  it  will  ensure  to 
those  who  must  fight  and  die  in  every  war 
the  influence  over  international  affairs  to 
which  they  are  entitled.  Few  intelligent 
men  will  regret  the  creation  of  a  confer- 
ence which  is  sure  to  increase  the  sense  of 
responsibility  as  it  does  the  power  of  labor, 
and  no  one  but  a  reactionary  can  oppose 
the  League  of  Nations  because  it  contains 
the  labor  section. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

AMERICA'S  TASK 

The  American  people  should  not  let  the 
honeyed  words  of  diplomacy  conceal  the 
fact  that  the  masses  in  Europe  are  begin- 
ning to  hate  America.  This  is  a  fact. 
They  see  us  safe  by  the  accident  of  dis- 
tance, and  rich  through  their  misfortunes. 
When  we  have  carried  through  our  policy 
of  ** America  for  Americans"  and  ''Why 
should  we  trouble  ourselves  over  Europe's 
troubles"  to  its  squalid  end,  we  shall  find 
one  bond  uniting  all  Europe — hatred  of 
America. 

It  is  not  too  late  to  save  the  situation, 
though  it  soon  will  be.  Already  the  task 
has  been  made  immensely  more  difficult  by 
a  year  of  delay.  Millions  have  died  dur- 
ing this  year — untold  millions  have  en- 
dured misery  and  starvation,  and  thou- 
sands upon  thousands  have  turned  in  des- 
peration to  the  Bolshevik  faith. 

88 


AMERICA'S  TASK  89 

As  to  what  we  are  called  upon  to  do,  it 
seems  to  me  very  clear : 

1st — Katify  the  Treaty  and  the  Covenant  and 
bring  American  leadership  to  the  building 
of  a  real  League  of  Nations. 

2d — Relieve  the  fears  of  France  and  assist  the 
righteous  forces  in  every  country  to  drive 
from  their  chancelleries  all  the  agents  of 
military  ambition  and  revenge. 

3d — Assume  that  financial  leadership  which  will 
be  gladly  accorded  us,  and  back  with  the 
enormous  wealth  acquired  during  the  war 
by  the  United  States  some  carefully 
worked  out  plan  for  the  financial  salvation 
of  Europe. 

4th — Forgive  France  all  the  debts  she  owes  the 
United  States  as  a  result  of  the  war. 

Not  forgive !  I  cannot  regard  this  as  an 
act  of  charity.  It  would  represent  no 
more  than  our  share  of  the  ''settlement." 
France  is  entitled  to  and  has  sore  need  of 
all  the  indemnity  provided  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles.  Hence,  if  we  must  in  the  in- 
terest of  world  restoration  join  Great 
Britain  in  advising  France  to  accept  a 
smaller  indemnity  from  Germany,  we  will 


90        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

be  hypocrites,  indeed,  if  we  permit  the  full 
burden  of  this  self-abnegation  to  fall  on 
the  most  sorely  wounded  of  our  allies. 
We  cannot  do  less  than  accept  cancella- 
tion of  the  Franco-American  loans  as  our 
share  of  the  allied  war  burden.  I  am  told 
that  this  suggestion  is  very  unpopular  in 
America.  This  is  quite  natural,  but  just 
as  the  American  people  cheerfully  spent 
billions  for  winning  the  war  when  they 
really  sensed  its  meaning,  so  I  believe  they 
would  cheerfully  relieve  France  of  this 
added  burden  if  they  knew  what  it  meant 
toward  the  winning  of  a  lasting  peace. 

We  did  not  enter  the  war  for  nearly 
three  years  because  we  did  not  realize  un- 
til then  that  the  issues  were  our  own. 
When  it  dawned  on  us  that  the  allies  were 
fighting  'Our  battles,  as  well  as  their  own, 
many  Americans  regretted  that  we  had  not 
gone  in  before.  Our  loans  to  France  are  a 
small  part  of  the  money  we  would  have 
spent  had  we  entered  the  war  a  year  ear- 
lier. France  spent  it  for  us,  and  in  addi- 
tion sent  to  their  death  during  that  year  a 
full  half  million  of  her  young  men  in  place 


AMERICA'S  TASK  91 

of  an  equal  number  of  American  boys  who 
would  now  be  buried  in  foreign  soil. 

I  have  yet  to  meet  an  American  in  close 
touch  with  the  details  of  the  French  and 
European  financial  situation  who  has  not 
agreed  with  the  above  conclusion.  I  have 
talked  with  the  most  practical,  unsenti- 
mental bankers  and  business  men.  I  have 
in  mind  one  man  in  particular,  a  very 
prominent  American  financier,  who  told 
me  that  when  he  came  to  Paris  he  would 
have  scoffed  at  the  suggestion  that  France 
be  relieved  of  any  part  of  the  American 
loans.  After  six  months'  ofificial  work  in 
European  capitals,  he  was  converted  to  not 
only  the  justice  but  the  necessity  of  such 
action  on  the  part  of  America.  He  added 
in  a  discouraged  tone — *'But  how  can  you 
get  the  real  facts  to  the  100,000,000  people 
at  home?" 

I  cannot,  however,  agree  with  Keynes 
that  the  American  loans  to  Great  Britain 
should  also  be  canceled.  The  conditions 
are  very  different  and  the  compelling  argu- 
ments for  relieving  France  do  not  apply  to 
Great  Britain.    It  is  after  all  a  business 


92        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

proposition.  France  has  suffered  from  an 
"impairment  of  capital,"  as  the  bankers 
would  say,  to  a  far  greater  extent  than 
Great  Britain.  In  addition  if  a  rational 
settlement  is  made  with  Germany  the  loss 
of  cash  indemnity  by  France  will  be  out  of 
all  proportion  to  that  of  the  other  allies. 
Great  Britain  has  already  obtained  advan- 
tages from  the  war  whose  value  for  her 
future  is  incalculable.  The  threat  to 
Great  Britain's  carrying  trade  which  just 
before  the  war  was  very  menacing  has 
been  removed  and  the  German  Merchant 
Fleet  has  been  very  largely  transferred  to 
her.  The  specter  of  a  growing  German 
navy  has  vanished.  The  British  Colonial 
Empire  has  been  immensely  strengthened 
at  the  expense  of  Germany,  and  the  re- 
moval of  German  intrigue  from  the  poli- 
tics of  the  near  East  has  relieved  a  former 
anxiety  for  the  safety  of  India. 

Finally,  as  concerns  relations  between 
France  and  Germany,  it  is  England's  pol- 
icy I  have  advocated  in  this  book.  If  we 
enter  the  League  of  Nations,  we  shall  find 
that  we  must  join  England  in  urging  upon 


AMERICA'S  TASK  93 

France  a  modification  of  her  claims  under 
the  Versailles  Treaty.  If  we  thus  ask  her 
to  give  up  that  which  is  justly  hers,  the 
benefit  of  her  sacrifices  will  accrue  to  Eng- 
land as  well  as  to  ourselves  and  the  rest 
of  the  world.  It  will  be  the  first  step  to- 
ward general  industrial  revival.  No  one 
denies  that  Great  Britain  played  a  major 
part  in  winning  the  war.  The  money  cost 
to  her  was  terrific.  She  has  a  staggering 
debt  and  immense  economic  problems,  but 
she  also  has  the  resources  with  which  to 
meet  those  problems. 

Going  back  to  the  second  point  suggested 
above,  a  question  will  undoubtedly  be 
raised  as  to  the  possibility  of  our  reliev- 
ing the  fear  of  France  and  thus  reverse 
the  militaristic  pohcy  to  which  this  fear 
has  led.  The  answer  is  contained  in  a 
statement  made  to  me  by  a  very  prominent 
French  statesman  during  the  excitement 
over  the  opposition  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
to  the  new  French  policy.  Said  he — ''If 
America  were  to  really  come  in  and  France 
felt  that  your  country  was  committed  to 
partnership  in  the  settlement  of  Europe, 


94        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

France  would  accept  any  advice  America 
might  offer."  He  meant  this  to  be  in  con- 
trast with  their  unwillingness  at  that  time 
to  accept  the  advice  of  England. 

In  spite  of  all  that  has  been  written  to 
the  contrary,  American  opinion  was  all- 
powerful  at  the  Peace  Conference.  This 
was  not  from  sentimental  or  personal  rea- 
sons, but  arose  from  two  considerations — 
first,  because  we  had  no  ''axes  to  grind"  or 
favors  to  seek  in  the  settlement;  second, 
because  it  was  evident  that  for  years  to 
come  the  financial  salvation  of  Europe 
would  depend  upon  American  aid.  Great 
Britain  has  weakened  her  influence  with 
the  continental  nations  by  too  much  suc- 
cess in  securing  those  results  which  she 
wished  from  the  war.  We  obtained  noth- 
ing and  asked  for  nothing. 

The  bankruptcy  of  Europe  is  so  uni- 
versal and  extreme  that  whether  we  will 
or  no,  America  will  sooner  or  later  be 
forced  to  act  as  an  informal  ''receiver." 
As  such  "receiver"  we  shall  be  obliged  for 
financial  security  to  insist  upon  peace  and 
the  adoption  of  policies  which  will  permit 


AMERICA'S  TASK  (K; 

tlie  energies  of  all  nations  to  be  devoted 
to  industry.  There  is  not  an  important 
nation  in  Europe  will  dare  to  defy  our  ex- 
pressed opinion. 

After  all,  a  majority  of  the  French  peo- 
ple long  for  peace.  They  have  been  con- 
verted to  the  Millerand  policies  by  fear 
alone.  They  are  not  blind  to  the  frailty 
of  any  military  defense  against  Germany. 
Our  joining  the  League  of  Nations  and  our 
evident  intention  to  back  only  those  na- 
tions which  accept  the  development  of  that 
League  as  the  basis  of  their  foreign  policy 
would  instantly  bring  a  feeling  of  safety  to 
the  French  people. 

It  would,  I  believe,  be  proper  to  make  it 
a  condition  for  canceling  the  French  loans 
that  such  revisions  of  the  Versailles  Treaty 
be  agreed  upon  as  seem  to  the  United 
States  necessary  for  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Our  whole-hearted  acceptance  of  the 
League  will  have  an  equally  decided  ef- 
fect on  the  policy  of  Germany.  That 
country  to-day  has  a  half  dozen  different 
policies.  The  people  are  hopelessly  di- 
vided and  their  opinions  distracted.     One 


96        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

element  has  used  every  possible  means  to 
keep  arms  and  ammunition  within  reach, 
against  hoped-for  opportunities.  Another 
is  for  throwing  overboard  without  reserve, 
at  least  for  the  time,  all  that  relates  to 
warfare,  both  plans  and  equipment,  in  the 
hopes  that  thus  the  allies  will  be  induced  to 
permit  economic  revival.  A  third  class, 
which  has  grown  to  huge  proportions  in 
nearly  all  parts  of  the  German  Empire,  is 
composed  of  workmen,  both  extreme  social- 
ists and  moderates,  who  have  a  deadly  ha- 
tred of  the  militaristic  junkers  of  the  old 
regime  and  will  back  all  the  disarmament 
plans  of  the  allies  with  a  fierce  determina- 
tion to  put  it  out  of  the  power  of  their 
former  rulers  to  execute  a  coup  d'etat  and 
lead  them  again  to  the  slaughter.  I  asked 
the  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  as 
to  a  story  I  had  heard  of  5,000  aeroplanes 
taken  to  pieces  and  the  parts  scattered  and 
concealed  throughout  Germany.  He  said 
that  even  if  the  German  Government  de- 
sired to  do  such  a  tiling,  it  would  be  im- 
possible— ''An  operation  of  that  kind  on 
even  a  much  smaller  scale  must  employ 


AMERICA'S  TASK  97 

workmen,  many  of  whom  would  jump  at 
the  chance  to  defeat  the  purpose  'of  the 
Government.  It  could  not  be  done  in  the 
first  place,  and  if  it  were,  detailed  infor- 
mation would  come  to  the  allies  from  a 
thousand  sources." 

There  is  a  fourth  class,  including  in  its 
numbers  many  of  the  old  aristocrats  who 
hope  and  more  than  half  expect  that  a 
wave  of  Bolshevism  will  sweep  over  the 
country.  They  believe  that  Germany 
could  recover  from  such  a  period  of  anar- 
chy quicker  than  other  continental  nations, 
and  when  they  say  that  Bolshevism  would 
surely  pass  from  Germany  into  France, 
their  longing  for  revenge  is  evident  in 
tone  and  gesture. 

The  Germans  are  accustomed  to  study- 
ing facts  and  learning  by  experience.  Be- 
fore the  war,  they  knew  better  even  than 
some  of  our  allies  the  overwhelming  re- 
sources possessed  by  the  United  States; 
they  knew  that  in  the  production  of  the 
sinews  of  war  we  outranked  any  three  of 
the  European  nations  combined ;  they  knew 


vJ 


98        WHILE  EUROPE  WAITS  FOR  PEACE 

that  we  had  half  the  coal  of  the  world  and 
produced  nearly  as  much  steel  and  iron  as 
all  Europe  taken  together;  they  knew  how 
great  was  our  monopoly  of  copper  and 
other  of  the  raw  materials  necessary  for 
fighting.  But  they  believed  we  would  not 
fight.  Now  they  know  that  we  will  fight 
and  that  we  can  fight,  and  I  believe  it  is 
written  large  on  every  page  of  the  hand- 
book of  German  diplomacy — ''No  more 
wars  unless  America  is  surely  on  our  side, 
.  or  at  least  is  sure  to  maintain  a  benevo- 
^0''^^  '       1^^^  neutraKty." 

Without  America  the  League  of  Na- 
tions is  a  puny,  mechanical  attempt  to  con- 
trol the  passions  of  international  hatred 
and  ambition.  Under  the  leadership  of 
America  the  League  of  Nations  would 
everywhere  strengthen  the  hands  of  those 
men  who  desire  to  turn  the  national  en- 
ergies permanently  toward  industry  and 
cooperation  rather  than  mutual  destruc- 
tion. It  would  encourage  the  forces  of  de- 
mocracy, and  would  discourage  that  junker 
class  which  still  in  many  countries  hopes 


AMERICA'S  TASK  99 

to  rebuild  national  slavery  and  its  own 
power  on  a  false  patriotism  and  the  hatred 
of  other  peoples. 


PEINTBD  IN  THE  rNTTBD  STATES  OT   AMEEICA 


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